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CHAPTER I. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
It is the business of economics as of almost every 
other science, to collect facts, to arrange and inter­
pret them and to draw inferences from them. 'Obser­
vation and description, definition and classification 
are preparatory activities. But what we desire to 
reach thereby is a knowledge of the interdependence 
of economic phenomena.. . . Induction and deduction 
are both needed for scientific thought as the right 
and left foot are needed for walking.'1 
A series of private and government directed study 
groups, initiated during the past 20 years, have resulted in 
a variety of proposed policy and regulatory changes to the 
2 U.S. financial system. One of the more controversial banking 
issues confronted in these studies is the impact of branch 
banking on the flow of funds between regions and thus funds 
availability in rural areas (127). Proponents of branch 
banking offer evidences suggesting the continued reliance on 
unit banking through restrictions on or prohibition of branch 
banking restricts flow of funds into rural areas. This leads 
to a net flow of funds from rural areas to more profitable 
urban areas, thus, making continued financing of the 
^Alfred Marshall (119, p. 29) quoting.Schmoller in the 
article on Volkswirtschaft in Conrad's Handworterbuch. 
^For example see (3, 16, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169). 
2 
agriculture and agri-business sector difficult. Opponents con­
tend the opposite, that liberalization of restrictions in fact 
results in serious deposit drains from rural areas. These con­
tradicting results are indicative of analyses directed at many 
of the proposed changes and existing inefficiencies in the 
financial system. 
While this dissertation was prompted by conflicting 
research findings surrounding proposed liberalization of com­
mercial bank branching laws, its appeal is to a broader class 
of problems concerned with effective local financial interme­
diation. Research efforts in this area have been primarily 
confined to econometric and descriptive analysis of a partic­
ular geographic area before and after a regulatory or policy 
change or to comparative analysis of geographic areas differing 
only in the proposal under consideration. They have not gen­
erally taken advantage of the unique economic environments of 
the areas or successfully dealt with the interactive effects of 
multiple changes. Econometric studies have been further ham­
pered by the inability to reflect market interaction of 
competing financial institutions or to adequately specify 
operational activities of firms at which many of the policy and 
regulatory changes are directed.^ 
^Jones (94) , in advocating greater operations research 
involvement in the financial area, points out that while the 
regression approach avoids subjective assessment of structural 
elements of the financial system, at the same time it fails to 
offer any inspiration for ideas for changing basic structural 
relationships. 
3 
The important issues affecting efficient local 
financial intermediation, concentrating on those especially 
important to agricultural finance, are delineated in chapter 
2. The role of operations research philosophy in a systematic 
examination of local financial markets is discussed and the 
advantageous deductive and inductive properties associated with 
a mathematical programming representation of local agricultural 
financial markets are identified. 
Although mathematical programming techniques have not 
been applied in the study of local financial markets, this 
research void has been recognized. Baker, Hopkin, and 
Brinegar expressed: 
. . . the need to improve models available to describe 
the status and functioning of financial markets. This 
problem will remain even if appropriate and efficient 
models were available for commercial banks, life in­
surance companies, cooperative lending agencies, and 
so on. However, the ready availability of firm models 
would greatly facilitate research in the area of finan­
cial markets, and would emphasize the need for market 
models to better describe the financial alternatives 
and constraints relevant to the intermediating firms 
(5, p. 8) . 
Referring more specifically to the problems of institutional 
reform, Boehlje suggested the potential application of spatial 
price and allocation models; 
Although current discussions are focused on restructur­
ing the full spectrum of financial institutions and 
electronic funds transfer systems, the issues of bank­
ing structure and the implications for flow of funds 
between rural and urban areas have been with us for 
many years. A definitive study of these issues possibly 
4 
using the concepts and models of interregional competi­
tion analysis would provide useful information to policy 
makers (21, p. 119). 
The application of the spatial activity analysis model 
of production and allocation, where price and flow quantities 
are endogenously determined, to local financial markets would 
meet two principal criticisms of current research efforts. 
The activity analysis structure provides flexibility and detail 
in modeling the nature of operational activities of interme­
diaries, and the spatial aspects of the model combined with 
endogenously determined prices can be used to reflect the 
market interaction of competing financial institutions. To 
indicate the feasibility of this approach, a spatial activity 
analysis model of financial intermediation in a perfect compe­
tition setting is presented in chapter 3. 
However, there are problems of extending the perfect 
competition model to financial markets. Most practical 
applications of such models have been to agricultural sector 
problems where perfect competition is a good representation 
of reality or a reasonable normative goal. They generally 
deal with well-defined geographic markets for homogeneous 
final products. Sometimes, they allow markets for interme­
diate products, but almost always consider raw materials or 
supplies as provided at a fixed cost. Financial markets, on 
the other hand, are characterized by oligopolistic behavior; 
market segmentation and product differentiation; government 
5 
regulation and intervention; and competition not only in 
marketing final products, loans and credit, but also compe­
tition for funds. A variation of the spatial activity analy­
sis model which reflects these unique characteristics of 
financial intermediation is developed in chapter 4. 
Many of the policy considerations in the intermedia­
tion process, whether concerned with banking or other finan­
cial institutions, can be analyzed using the common 
mathematical structure described in chapter 4. A series of 
prototypes representing the commercial banking structure are 
presented in chapter 5. The prototypes are used to extend the 
competitive concepts described in chapters 3 and 4 to include 
differentiated products, advertising variables, modeling spe­
cific noncompetitive environments such as market share solu­
tion to the oligopoly problem, and intertemporal modeling. 
Recent studies indicate that the allocative efficiency 
of optimization models of individual financial firms is greatly 
reduced by the uncertainty involved in predicting data inputs 
such as interest rates, loan demand, and deposit volume (52, 
143). A priori one would expect this effect to be magnified 
when individual firms' portfolios are linked and market 
interactions are considered. Specification of market loan 
demand and deposit supply functions must be the first and most 
important step in data support. Only limited econometric work 
has been completed in estimating the supply and demand for 
6 
financial assets and liabilities in the aggregate farm sector. 
There exists no comprehensive treatment on the microeconomic 
level of local markets. Theoretical and data acquisition con­
siderations , in estimating the supply and demand for financial 
assets and liabilities in rural Iowa counties, are presented 
in chapter 6. Alternative estimation procedures and initial 
empirical results are given. 
To reiterate, this study is designed to be a basic 
reference for those who wish to do policy analyses of changes 
impacting local financial intermediation. In addition to pro­
viding a comprehensive examination of the recent and proposed 
institutional and regulatory changes impacting local finan­
cial markets and a comprehensive summary of the most important 
applications of mathematical programming to individual finan­
cial intermediaries and financial markets, the principal objec­
tive is to develop variations of the spatial activity analysis 
model which capture the unique characteristics of financial 
intermediation. The models can be applied not only to regional 
problems but also to very localized financial activity. Empiri­
cal models could be designed and exercised by policy groups or 
by individual intermediaries desiring insights for improved 
operational decisions by more comprehensive modeling of their 
market and interfirm activities. 
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A few brief examples better illustrate the type of problems 
on which initial empirical efforts could focus. The impact of 
branching, for example within or across county lines, could be 
examined by developing a baseline model structure, exclusive 
of branch activity, and then comparing price and flow of funds 
outcomes with results obtained from alternative model formula­
tions including branch activities. The model could then be 
used to identify parameters and structural elements to which 
results were most sensitive, or could be used for developing 
strategies for placement of branch facilities. The effects of 
electronic funds transfer could be examined in a similar fashion 
by altering transaction costs and flow of funds channels asso­
ciated with electronic funds transfer. Finally the impacts on 
local interest rates and flow of funds due to expanded savings 
and loan association authorities and phasing out of interest 
rate ceilings and differentials on deposits could be examined, 
possibly with focus on changing credit flows to agriculture. 
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CHAPTER II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH; A NEW DIRECTION 
This chapter introduces the complexities of financial 
intermediation in the United States and the myriad institu­
tional and regulatory changes which financial institutions, 
especially agricultural financial institutions, face in the 
1980s. The potential impact of these changes has not been 
systematically analyzed by either the financial industry or 
the government, and there is both an absence of and the need 
for a comprehensive policy analyses capability. The contribu­
tions of operations research to modeling the behavior of indi­
vidual financial firms and the limited research directed at 
the financial intermediation system are detailed. Finally, a 
concise problem statement and description of the general 
approach of the remainder of this study are given. The 
approach builds on existing research on individual firms by 
extending spatial price and allocation models to provide a 
general analytic framework for policy analyses in local finan­
cial markets in general and specifically in rural agricultural 
financial markets. 
Financial Intermediation 
Definition 
Financial intermediaries perform two essential 
functions (5). They facilitate transfer of funds from savers 
9 
to investors and, in so doing, transform the risk and 
liquidity properties of those funds. In acquiring funds from 
surplus units—municipalities, corporations, businesses, and 
individuals—the intermediaries issue claims on themselves, 
such as deposit, note, certificate, or bond liabilities. They 
allocate the funds to alternative users in return for claims 
on those units and payments which are then returned to sup­
pliers of funds or accrue as profits to the intermediaries. 
The role of the intermediary is better described by developing 
a simple scenario (108). 
Consider an economy where legal tender is the only 
primary security, the only claim to wealth. Unable to lend or 
borrow, individuals must allocate current income and past 
savings among current consumption; current savings; and cur­
rent capital formation, in anticipation of a future stream of 
income and consumption. Capital formation is hindered in two 
ways; (1) individuals with surplus funds are limited by their 
entrepreneurial abilities; and (2) many large capital projects 
cannot be undertaken since there is a practical limit on an 
individual's resource accumulation. 
If savers are allowed direct transfer of funds to 
investors, in the form of lending, more efficient resource 
utilization and increased income are possible. As potential 
users compete for surplus funds, saving is encouraged since 
savers receive a higher return than they could earn in 
10 
isolation. Some of the inefficiency in resource allocation 
is corrected as additional worthwhile investment activities 
are undertaken. Many interferences remain, however, which 
prevent optimal savings and investment patterns. Ignorant of 
investment alternatives, savers incur costs in search of 
maximum potential return. Entrepreneurs' costs include 
searching out many prospective investors and convincing them 
of the credit worthiness of the intended capital projects. 
The resultant transaction, exchange of surplus funds for a 
primary security, is a compromise. Holders of surplus funds, 
desiring security in their claims on wealth, are apt to demand 
liquid, short-term commitments and minimum risk or high pre­
miums for accepting greater risks. Users of funds prefer 
long-term commitments and minimum payments for risk acceptance. 
When financial intermediation is allowed, specialized 
firms evolve and engage in a type of arbitrage between sup­
pliers and users of funds. Specialization leads to a more 
accurate assessment of risk and more comprehensive knowledge 
of investment alternatives. This knowledge,coupled with large 
transaction volume,reduces risks and permits these middlemen 
to more readily accept risks that individuals would not ac­
cept. The intermediaries acquire funds in exchange for 
liabilities on themselves. These claims, assets to the indi­
vidual holders, are characterized by less risk, shorter 
maturities, and higher return than the individuals generally 
11 
could negotiate directly. The intermediaries then allocate 
funds among competing uses in return for assets in the form 
of primary claims on borrowers. These liabilities to the in­
vestors are characterized by longer durations, and lower risk 
premiums than the entrepreneurs could have generally nego­
tiated directly. The margin or difference, as in any form 
of arbitrage, between the amount paid to the suppliers of funds 
and the amount received in payment from the users accrues as 
profit. 
Financial intermediaries 
In a modern capitalistic society,nearly all businesses 
and many individuals play such an intermediary role. However, 
the term financial intermediary is usually reserved for those 
firms whose liabilities are almost exclusively financial claims 
on themselves and whose assets are almost entirely financial 
claims on others (11). Krooss and Blyn (108) provide a com­
prehensive history of financial intermediation primarily 
directed at commercial banks, investment banks, trust 
companies, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, 
life insurance companies, noninsured pension funds, investment 
companies, and credit unions. Additionally, the authors in­
clude in a broader set of financial intermediaries government 
agencies—the Federal Reserve System, postal savings system. 
Federal Farm Credit System, social security funds, and 
12 
government pension funds—security brokers and dealers, 
mortgage companies, finance companies and small business 
investment companies. The relative importance of the major 
financial intermediary types, as shown in a flow-of-credit 
diagram for the United States, indicates that the commercial 
banking system including the Federal Reserve System represents 
the single most diversified and important part of the United 
States financial system (29) . Much of the discussion that 
follows focuses on the commercial banking system. 
As indicated in table 2.1, commercial banking and the 
Farm Credit System (FCS) are the principal institutional 
lenders to agriculture. The banks, associations and coopera­
tives of the FCS are federally chartered instruments of the 
United States but are owned by their respective borrowers, who 
are required to purchase stock in the institutions. The FCS 
is able to enhance credit availability to American agriculture 
by acquiring funds, through the sale of bonds and notes, in 
national money markets and then providing short- and long-term 
loans at interest rates which are held to the lowest possible 
level while maintaining a sound financial posture. The FCS 
is made up of three types of lending institutions: (1) 12 
Federal Land Banks (FLB) and their 505 owner Federal Land 
Bank Associations; 91 percent of FLB loans are used for pur­
chasing new real estate, improving land and buildings, or 
refinancing previous real estate and short-term loans; 
Table 2.1. Farm debt outstanding; By lender as of January 1 (176) 
Percent 
Farm Real Estate Debt 
Total^ Commercial Fed. Land Life Ins. Farm Home Individuals^ 
($ Millions) Banks Banks Companies Administr. and Others 
1920 8,449 14.3 3.5 11.5 70.7 
1930 9,631 10.4 12.5 22.0 55.1 
1940 6,586 8.1 30.5 14.9 .5 45.9 
1950 5,579 16.7 16.2 21.0 3.6 42.5 
1960 12,082 12.6 19.3 23.3 5.6 39.1 
1970 29,183 12.1 22.9 19.6 7.8 37.5 
1975 46,288 12.9 29.0 13.6 6.9 37.6 
1979 72,978 11.7 33.7 14.4 6.2 33.9 
1980 85,850 10.1 34.6 14.2 8.1 33.0 
Nonreal Estate Farm Debt 
Production Other Institutional 
Total Commercial Credit Debt to Fed. Inter- Farm : Home Individual 
($ Millions) Banks Assns. mediate Credit Banks Administr. and Other 
1950 5,154 39.8 7.5 1.0 6 .7 45.0 
1955 7,196 40.8 8.0 .8 5 .8 44.6 
1960 11,528 41.8 1.8 .8 3 .5 42.2 
1965 16,366 42.7 13.9 .8 3 .9 38.7 
1970 21,168 48.8 21.2 1.0 3 .7 25.2 
1975 35,225 51.8 27.0 1.1 3 .0 17.2 
1978 51,142 50.3 26.4 .7 6 .1 16.4 
1979 59,600 47.4 25.2 .9 9 .0 17.5 
1980 70,300 43.9 25.7 .9 12 .8 16.7 
^Estimated 
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(2) 12 Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (FICB) and the 425 
Production Credit Associations (PCA) which serve as their link 
with borrowers; PCAs provide short-term credit for operating 
expenses, livestock purchase and production, equipment pur­
chase, living expenses and real estate; (3) 13 Banks for 
Cooperatives which provide dependable and continuing financing 
to over 3000 agricultural cooperatives (176). 
Credit-granting services represent only one of two 
broad classes of products produced by commercial banks. 
Equally important are deposit-holding services. Thrift insti­
tutions—savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, 
and credit unions—represent the major competitor group for 
deposit services. The importance of commercial banking in 
agriculture is illustrated in table 2.2, which shows its 
relative importance in both credit-granting and deposit-
holding in Iowa. 
In order to help understand the potential impacts of 
proposed changes in the financial system on local agricul­
tural financial markets, appendix A provides a more detailed 
summary of the characteristics of intermediaries' services to 
agriculture. 
Nelson, Lee, and Murray (130) provide a more in-depth 
description of intermediaries in agricultural finance. 
Cambridge Research Institution has prepared a quantitative 
delineation of deposit and lending characteristics of differ­
ent intermediaries (29). 
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Table 2.2. 
Importance of commercial banking in Iowa (83, 164) 
Percent 
Farm Real Estate 
Debt as of 
1/1/75 
Nonreal Estate Deposits 
Farm Debt as of as of 
1/1/75 12/31/76 
Commercial Banks 
Federal Land Banks 
Life Insurance Co. 
Farmers Home Admin­
istration 
Individuals & Others 
Production Credit 
Associations 
Federal Intermediate 
Credit Banks 
Savings & Loan Asso­
ciations 
Credit Unions 
6.5 
20.4 
15.6 
4.7 
52.9 
78.6 74.0 
2 . 2  
18.8 
.4 
23.9 
2.1 
16 
Local markets 
The interactions of financial intermediaries, savers 
and investors and the resulting transactions in a myriad of 
financial instruments constitute the nation's financial 
markets. This study concentrates on local financial markets 
delimited by local suppliers and users of funds and the 
intermediaries that serve them. While the term local finan­
cial markets is often used (11, 130), practical delineation 
of such markets is a difficult and imprecise task. It is 
unlikely that demand and supply for credit in an isolated 
market will be equated at a price reflecting a marginal 
product in use equal to that in other markets. However, 
markets are not isolated; they are linked by a communica­
tions network and a continuous flow of funds between geo­
graphically separated suppliers and users of credit. The 
financial system is in fact a hierarchy of imperfect linkages 
between local, regional, national, and international inter­
mediaries. Even if the linkages between financial markets 
were perfect, unique risk characteristics of local markets 
and the transport or transaction cost of moving funds from 
surplus areas to net demand areas would result in unequal 
rates in local markets. However, an absence of imperfec­
tions would lead to an optimal allocation of funds as the 
marginal product of credit in all uses and areas was equal­
ized. To the extent that imperfections prevent such an 
17 
optimal allocation, they may affect the balance of economic 
activity in regions or sectors of the economy. Surplus areas, 
without alternative uses for funds, finance over production 
with resulting lower returns per unit of resource use; net 
demand areas, without access to outside funds, forego produc­
tion possibilities with higher returns per unit resource use 
(130). In the extreme, financial collapse of an area or 
sector can result if units cannot meet desired or needed cash 
flows from normal sources of operating income or from finan­
cial intermediaries. Demand units forced to withdraw from 
the market sell off inventories. The disruption of business 
activity and fluctuations in market rates can lead surplus 
units to withdraw from the market, thus affecting still more 
demanding units (169, p. 394). 
The ability of local intermediaries to allocate credit 
efficiently in local markets depends on the strength of four 
types of linkages: (1) the linkage between local suppliers 
of funds and surplus units outside the local market; (2) the 
linkage between local users of funds and units demanding 
credit outside the local market; (3) the linkage, primarily 
through local intermediaries, between local suppliers and 
users of credit; and (4) the overall linkage between the 
sector encompassing a number of local markets and the rest 
of the economy (11). Krooss and Blyn (108) describe improve­
ments in the financial system as a continual process of 
18 
innovation aimed at (1) encouraging savings, (2) making 
borrowing easier, and (3) improving the liquidity and geo­
graphic mobility of financial instruments so as to narrow 
the gap between savers and investors. Haley (67) adds an 
important concept in defining well-functioning financial mar­
kets. He contends a system should (1) be efficient in allo­
cation and operation, that is, provide minimum cost services 
whenever sufficient demand for them exists; (2) be competi­
tive, that is, not exploitive of lenders or borrowers in 
terms of availability or costs of services; (3) be respon­
sive, that is, willing and able to supply innovative tech­
niques in response to changing customer needs; and (4) be 
stable, that is, not excessively prone to failure or service 
curtailment as a result of changing economic conditions. 
This final consideration has played a major role in the 
evolution of the current legal, regulatory and supervisory 
structure of the financial system in the United States. 
Current issues affecting local financial markets 
The Commission on Money and Credit sponsored by the 
Committee for Economics Development from 1958 to 1961 
recommended relaxation or elimination of a number of the 
regulatory restrictions enmeshing the U.S. financial system 
(29, p. 95). Since then, every congressional or presiden­
tial directed examination of the financial system—President 
19 
Kennedy's Committee on Financial Institutions (Heller 
report), 1964; President's Committee on Financial Structure 
and Regulation (Hunt Commission), 1971; President Nixon's 
Recommendations for Change in the U.S. Financial System, 
1975; Financial Institutions Act of 1976; Financial Insti­
tutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE) Study, 1976; Financial 
Institutions Act of 1976; U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs' First Meeting on the Condition of 
the Banking System; Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980—has attempted to reconcile the 
conflict between a competitive and stable financial system;^ 
For well over a century the American public has 
insisted that its financial institutions be both 
competitive and sound. The two objectives are not 
easily reconciled, and yet both must be achieved 
if we are to avoid, on the one hand, a highly con­
centrated financial structure and, on the other, a 
system unable to withstand the vicissitudes of 
economic change. The public is entitled to the 
benefits of a dynamic and innovative system respon­
sive to shifting needs. Yet the public also should 
be able to rely on the strength and soundness of the 
system (168, p. 291) 
In response to a FINE Study guestionnaire, the Comp­
troller of the Currency identified three areas of unrecon­
ciled conflict between the concepts of stability and 
competition: (1) statutes which set interest rate ceilings 
^See (3, 6, 16, 29, 30, 114, 140, 165, 166, 167, 168, 
169) . 
20 
on deposits, allow rate differentials between commercial 
banks and other financial institutions, and prohibit pay­
ment of interest on demand deposits; (2) statutes regulat­
ing branching and mergers; and (3) statutes setting limits 
on the activities of financial intermediaries (168, p. 307). 
Appendix B reiterates these basic conflicts by identifying 
and comparing the major recommendations of the Hunt 
Commission, President Nixon's recommendations, the 
Financial Institution Act of 1976, and the FINE study.^ 
Though few of the recommendations of any of these 
studies were enacted into law, they remained critical issues 
facing the financial system. A list of issues facing 
banking, identified in a survey prepared for the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Currency and Urban Affairs (1977) , 
included most of the basic recommendations of earlier 
groups; (1) electronic banking, (2) one consolidated fed­
eral banking regulatory agency, (3) removal of ceiling rates 
on time and savings deposits, (4) payment of interest on 
checking, accounts, (5) granting checking account powers to 
savings and loan associations, (6) unlimited statewide 
branching, (7) branching across state boundaries, (8) con­
tinued bank holding company expansion and diversification, 
(9) increased disclosure of banking data, (10) public 
1 
The table is not a comprehensive list of recommenda­
tions; however, an attempt has been made to include the major 
recommendations of each report. 
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disclosure of bank problem lists, (11) public disclosure of 
bank examination data, (12) operation of U.S. banks in for­
eign countries, (13) operation of foreign banks in the U.S. 
(169, p. 539) . 
The major study groups recognized the importance of 
treating structural changes in a totality not as a set of 
disparate actions. Both the Hunt Commission recommendation 
in 1971 and the FINE study in 1976 represent comprehensive 
proposals for improving the competitive environment of the 
financial system and for creating a homogeneity of powers 
necessary for existing intermediaries to compete successfully. 
The nearer to legislative enactment, the more piecemeal were 
the proposals. The FINE report never emerged from House and 
Senate committee action in 1976. The Financial Institution 
Act of 1976, which would have allowed demand deposit and 
expanded lending powers to thrift institutions, was defeated 
in the House Banking, Currency and Housing Committee in May 
1976. Piecemeal bills were tabled by the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee in September 1976. 
Vigorous industry actions to push interpretation of existing 
statutes to their limits and changing state laws allowed 
thrift institutions to issue interest and noninterest bearing 
third-party accounts similar to bank demand deposits (114). 
These advances were not accompanied by balancing legislative 
change in thrift institutions' lending powers or commercial 
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bank powers for interest payment on demand deposits. In 
April 1979, a Pedert 1 District Court declared illegal three 
fund-transfer mechanisms which had been approved for commer­
cial banks (automatic transfer from savings to checking), 
savings and loans (remote service units) and credit unions 
(share drafts) by federal bank regulators. The Court said 
only Congress could approve such fund-transfer mechanisms 
which effectively allowed interest to be paid on checking 
accounts (6). 
The court ban which would have been effective 
January 1, 1980, and the inflationary pressures of 1979-1980 
on existing restrictions, such as interest rate ceilings on 
deposit accounts and usury ceilings, created an imperative 
for legislative action. On June 21, 1979, President Carter 
announced a financial reform bill focused on phasing out 
interest rate ceilings on deposits at commercial banks and 
savings and loans, removing the h percent rate differential 
for savings and loans and savings banks, and allowing interest 
to be paid on transaction accounts. Much of the administra­
tion's proposal was already included in legislation filed 
in June 1979 by Senators William Proxmire, Chairman of the 
Senate Banking Committee, and Alan Cranston, Chairman of the 
Financial Institutions Subcommittee. During 1979, the legis­
lature extended the court-set deadline on fund-transfer 
mechanisms to March 31, 1980. On March 31, 1980, President 
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Carter signed into law the Depository Institution Deregula­
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Major provisions 
of the legislation are as follows: (1) end (phase out) 
deposit interest rate ceilings and k percent differential 
for thrift institutions, (2) statutory authority for funds 
transfer mechanisms, (3) permit nationwide negotiable orders 
of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, (4) eliminate usury ceilings 
on home mortgages, (5) increase federal deposit insurance 
limit, (6) provide access to the Federal Reserve's discount 
window to all depository institutions, (7) impose universal 
reserve requirements including required reserves on all 
transaction accounts at all depository institutions, (8) 
establish fees for Federal Reserve services, (9) simplify 
truth-in-lending law and regulations, and (10) expand power 
of thrift institutions to include allowing Federal credit 
unions to offer residential real estate loans and to allow 
savings and loans greater loan flexibility and expanded in­
vestment authority (6, 140). 
While the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 was landmark legislation, it 
was less comprehensive in its treatment of major issues 
facing the financial community than were earlier study 
groups. For the most part,the legislation was a reaction 
to the conflict between industry actions and the court ban 
on fund-transfer mechanisms and to the conflict between 
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interest rate ceilings and high inflation. No systematic 
analyses of the impact of these changes on the financial com­
munity were completed. The frustrations these uncertainties 
create in the financial community are reflected in the fol­
lowing response to an industry survey conducted by The 
Bankers Magazine; 
The uncertainty of pending Congressional legis­
lation pertaining to the banking industry and the 
myriad changes that are inevitably dictated by Federal 
regulatory agencies interpreting new legislation are 
critical problems facing the banking industry today. 
We have a lack of confidence in Congress' ability to 
understand the nature of our business and to make 
intelligent decisions that will have a lasting effect 
on our industry. The uncertainty surrounding these 
potential legislative changes has a severe impact on 
our ability to effectively plan for the future (178, 
p. 47). 
There can be no doubt that enactment of broad legis­
lative changes, piecemeal changes, or simply industry actions 
to effect policy changes all affect the intermediation proc­
ess in local financial markets. An unending series of uncer­
tainties faces local markets and requires a method for policy 
analyses. Additionally, agricultural finance markets face a 
set of specific problems and proposals. 
Issues affecting agricultural financial markets 
Increased capital and credit requirements for 
agricultural and agribusiness have generated concern for the 
existing financial structure's effectiveness in servicing 
agricultural credit needs. The result has been specific 
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proposals for structural change to financial intermediation 
systems serving local agricultural finance markets. 
In 1973, the American Bankers Association (ABA) 
Agricultural Credit Task Force identified two major hin­
drances to commercial bank expansion in agricultural 
lending: (1) rural banks encounter difficulty in acquiring 
funds from outside the local market; and (2) the Cooperative 
Farm Credit System agencies maintain exemption from state 
usury laws and federal tax exemptions which allow a compet­
itive advantage over commercial banks (3). The task force 
considered alternatives in four general areas; (1) banking 
sources of funds, (2) nonbanking sources of funds, (3) bank 
management and supervisory agency relations, and (4) state 
and federal law changes (3, p. 13). They supported improve­
ments in channeling funds from urban to rural areas through 
correspondent relationships, loan participation agreements 
between banks in neighboring geographic areas, competition 
for funds in the national financial market through holding 
company affiliation or establishment of regional finance 
corporations, increased government loan guarantee programs, 
discounting loans with Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, 
and changes in federal and state law to eliminate usury and 
tax exemption for agencies of the Cooperative Farm Credit 
System. The task force was ambivalent toward changes in 
branch banking regulations as a means of improving funds 
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availability in rural areas. The newly created Federal 
Reserve seasonal borrowing privileges were considered insig­
nificant in light of their nonavailability to a large number 
of nonmember banks.^ 
The findings of the Federal Reserve Committee on 
Rural Banking Problems convened from 1971-1975, in general 
parallel those of the ABA task force. The committee pointed 
out that rural banks' inability to raise funds in the 
national financial market had two detrimental consequences: 
(1) due to the seasonal demands of agriculture and many 
rural businesses, banks unable to access short-term funds 
held a disproportionate amount of liquid assets to meet 
seasonal needs—thus not providing maximum credit to local 
areas; (2) banks servicing areas with an overall net credit 
demand could not access outside funds to close the gap be­
tween local suppliers and users of funds (16). Specific 
committee proposals included changes in correspondent rela­
tions to allow rural banks to purchase city bank services and 
thereby retaining funds that would otherwise be tied up in 
nonearning correspondent balances. Contrary to the ABA sug­
gestion, the committee recommended vigorous promotion of the 
Federal Reserve seasonal borrowing privilege. Like the ABA 
The seasonal borrowing privilege was implemented in 
April 1973. It permitted member banks without access to 
national money markets and experiencing seasonal outflows ex­
ceeding 5 percent of their average total deposits to meet that 
seasonal need by borrowing from the Federal Reserve. 
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task force, the committee encouraged holding company affilia­
tion and development of regional agricultural finance cor­
porations and concluded that the evidence of the effects of 
removing branch banking restrictions was inconclusive. 
As with the industry at large, the impact of the 
many changes of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 on agricultural financial 
markets is uncertain. The law preempted state ususry 
ceilings on all business and agricultural loans of more than 
$25,000 until April 1, 1983, unless reimposed by state legis­
lation. At the same time, it set a federal ceiling at 
5 percentage points above the discount rate plus any surcharge 
(140). In the short run,this should allow commercial banks 
more effective competition with the Farm Credit System. The 
phase out of interest rate ceilings and the preference to 
thrift institutions and access to the Federal Reserve dis­
count window for nonmember institutions should improve com­
mercial banking competition for deposits and access to funds. 
Probably most significant for agricultural financial markets 
was the failure of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 to address the issue of 
branch banking. Branch banking is likely to remain a major 
legislative concern in the 1980s. 
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Branch banking 
Clearly the magnitude of recent and proposed changes 
to the financial system is great. For the most part the pro­
posals are the result of theoretical economic arguments for 
greater reliance on the discipline of the marketplace as a 
means of achieving efficiencies in the intermediation proc­
ess. On the other hand, empirical evidences of the quanti­
tative and often qualitative effects of specific proposals 
or groups of proposals are fragmented and often inconclusive. 
A more detailed discussion of the proposed liberalization 
of bank branching should provide an insight into the problems 
of empirical analysis and help identify an improved method 
for analysis of alternatives. 
Since the inception of the Bank of Pennsylvania, 
chartered by the Continental Congress in 1781, a dual com­
mercial banking system has evolved in the United States. 
The nation's 14,700 commercial banks are chartered, regulated 
and supervised by agencies in the 50 states and three Federal 
agencies—Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
Federal Reserve System (FRS), and Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC). One of the primary provinces of 
states is regulation of branching within their boundaries. 
Twenty states allow statewide branching; twelve restrict bank 
activity to unit banks; and eighteen permit some form of 
limited branching (169). 
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Just as alternative proposals affect different 
elements of the financial system and thus make their net 
effect difficult to determine, a single change can influence 
many aspects of effective intermediation. Mote (12 7) provides 
a survey of empirical studies regarding the merits of branch­
ing and identifies five major issues or areas affected by 
branching; (1) operating efficiency, (2) availability of 
banking facilities, (3) competition, (4) prices of services, 
and (5) lending policies and the mobility of funds.^ 
A priori arguments both supporting and denying cost 
efficiencies in branch bank operations have been presented. 
Proponents contend branch bank operations should reflect 
economies of scale in personnel management, investment port­
folio management, general administration and other centrally 
located functions. Opponents suggest that if such economies 
exist they are offset by increased costs of supervision and 
delegation of authority and branch offices. Empirical analy­
ses, primarily descriptive attempts to compare branch and 
unit operations of a given output size, have been fragmented 
and inconclusive. Significant efforts have been made in re­
fining the concept of equal output. Comparison of branch 
operations and unit operations—of equal size in terms o£ 
^Subsequent discussion of these issues summarizes 
Mote's analysis. He provides a comprehensive bibliography 
of empirical analyses of branch banking (127, pp. 4-5). 
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some aggregate measure such as total assets—generally 
conclude branch operations are more expensive. Such studies 
disregard time and transportation costs which are presumably 
higher to unit bank customers. In an effort to equalize 
customer inconvenience expenses, studies have compared branch 
bank operations to a comparable group of unit banks. Results 
were mixed, dependent on size and output mix. Specific 
analyses of individual bank functions too gave mixed results. 
In all the research efforts, the difficulty of characterizing 
branch and unit banks by the same set of products remained, 
since branch locations able to access surplus funds from 
geographically separate branches may be able to offer ser­
vices a unit bank is unable to support. 
Most often, availability of services has been examined 
at an aggregate level by comparing the population per office 
ratios of unit and branching areas. While regression analysis 
has been used in an attempt to isolate the effects of unique 
economic characteristics of a particular region, models for 
the most part have been poorly specified. General conclusions 
are that ratios are higher in unit than in branching areas— 
only for locations in excess of 7,500 population. However, 
criteria like population per office are suspect as measures 
of available services. 
A similar problem of appropriate criterion exists 
when trying to determine the effects of branching on 
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competition. Nearly all the econometric and comparative 
analyses use some measure of market concentration as a proxy 
for competition. Concentration ratios, herfindahl index and 
gini coefficient are often accepted in economic and legal 
arguments as measures of potential market power (74) . In 
fact, they are not measures of competition and are affected 
by many variables besides branching. Findings again prove 
to be inconclusive concerning the effects of branching on 
these ratios. 
Probably the most important issue to the consumer or 
public is the effect of branching on prices of bank services. 
Prices respond to (1) concentration of resources, (2) oligo­
polistic efforts to exclude competitor entry into the market, 
(3) operational efficiencies, (4) costs of information, 
transaction and other impediments to the most productive 
allocation of funds, and (5) the ability to diversify risk 
by geographic decentralization of operations. No conclusive 
empirical studies have been conducted concerning the branch 
banking effect on these elements. More so, when significant 
differences have been observed, the causal explanation has 
not been apparent. For example, are unit banks able to 
provide demand deposit services at a lower cost because of 
operational efficiencies, greater competition, or simply 
because they are able to charge higher interest rates in the 
asset market? 
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One of the most controversial issues in branch 
banking, especially in the agricultural areas, has been branch 
banking effects on the use and subsequent flow of funds be­
tween markets. Opponents of branching claim branches in 
rural areas serve as siphoning points accessing funds from 
rural areas and channeling them to urban centers. Reverse 
arguments are presented by branch banking supporters; that is, 
because of the unit bank structure, excessive amounts of funds 
flow from rural areas in terms of federal funds sold, corres­
pondent balances, and net direct balances. Mote (127) cor­
rectly points out that these studies fail to recognize that 
the interest of depositors and borrowers in an area may not 
coincide. To the extent that returns reflect value in use, 
economic efficiency may be served by allocation of funds to 
the highest return. 
The brief comments on branch banking allow some 
general observations: 
1. Even a single proposed change to the financial 
system affects a number of elements of efficient inter­
mediation. 
2. Empirical studies have been confined to 
comparative analysis, economic estimation, and limited 
econometric based simulation.^ 
^For an application of simulation in the analysis of 
alternative branch banking in West Virginia, see (70). 
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3. Empirical results have provided insight into 
important aspects of the problem, recognition of many ana­
lytical difficulties, and improved measurement criteria but 
in the net have been inconclusive in determining the effects 
of branching. 
4. No empirical effort has been made to consider all 
the aspects of the problem simultaneously. 
The role of operations research and existing uses of 
optimization models in the study of financial intermediation 
process provide a basis for pursuing development of a 
methodology which alleviates these limitations. 
Operations Research 
The history of operations research^ and its method-
2 
ology have been recorded in detail. The brief comments 
of this section are a synthesis of a number of those ac­
counts. They are meant to provide a basis (1) for under­
standing the approach and scope of this dissertation, and 
One of the earliest accounts of the formal organiza­
tion and activities of operations research teams prior to and 
during World War II is given by Crowther and Whiddington (45). 
Chacko (31) provides a unique discussion combining history 
and methodology and gives reference to a variety of seminal 
accounts of operations research published by the British 
Admiralty during World War II. 
2 
While a great number of works are available, the fol­
lowing (2, 15, 28, 31, 77, 141) reflect the breadth of inter­
pretation given to operations research. 
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(2) for developing a perspective for explaining the void of 
research into local financial markets. 
Definition 
The definition accepted by the Operational Research 
Society of Great Britain, the oldest professional operations 
research society, follows: 
Operations research is the attack of modern 
science on complex problems arising in the direction 
and management of large systems of men, machines, 
materials, and money in industry, business, govern­
ment and defense. Its distinctive approach is to 
develop a scientific model of the system, incor­
porating measurements of factors such as chance and 
risk, with which to predict and compare the outcomes 
of alternative decisions, strategies or controls. 
The purpose is to help management determine its 
policy and actions scientifically (15, p. 92). 
The definition includes the essential characteristics of 
operations research; it is (1) multidisciplinary, (2) systems 
oriented, (3) directed at assisting in the management decision 
process, (4) scientific in method, and (5) prescriptive. 
Essential characteristics 
The scientific method^ (model) is central to 
operations research (OR), but it is not what makes OR unique. 
The interaction of the five essential characteristics re­
flected in the definition define the OR regime. 
1 
The OR method can be grouped into a number of pos­
sible steps, but most groupings include problem identifica­
tion, model construction, experimentation, implementation 
and validation. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the nature of the scientific 
model. The model is ideally an isomorphism, a convergence 
or one-to-one correspondence of two system representations. 
One emanates from the managerial realm, the other from the 
scientific realm. The importance of a multidisciplinary 
background for the OR scientist or team is first apparent 
in the need for sufficient familiarity with managerial and 
organizational concepts to facilitate communication with 
management and insight into management's decision process. 
As the managerial problem crystallizes, the scientist begins 
an analogous conceptualization. The similarity in the con­
ceptual model depends in large part on the scientist's 
ability to draw innovative formulations from a vast array of 
disciplinary approaches. 
System decisions represents a range from tactical to 
strategic. Ackoff offers three considerations; 
(1) the longer the effect of a decision and the 
less reversible it is, the more strategic it is; 
(2) the larger portion of a system that is af­
fected by a decision, the more strategic it is; 
(3) the more concerned a decision is with the 
selection of goals and objectives, as well as the 
means by which they are to be obtained, the more 
strategic it is (54, p. 601). 
OR has been widely and successfully applied at the tactical 
level where there is often a single well defined objective. 
As the problem becomes more strategic, more system components 
become relevant and the greater is the need for 
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multidisciplinary cooperation in understanding the diverse 
system components. Much of the future challenge for OR is 
at higher system levels. 
Figure 2.1 emphasizes the rigorous formulation of a 
model. Often the value to management depends on the concise­
ness, clarity and accuracy of this model phase. Historically, 
OR has been characterized by a transformation from the de­
scriptive and qualitative to the quantitative and causal. 
Seldom is the isomorphism ideal. Erroneous insights, 
poorly drawn analogies, and deletion of relevant components 
in an attempt to quantify the system all may lead to spurious 
results. Experimentation of empirical validation is the 
test of the model. If the isomorphism is imperfect and the 
degree of accuracy not acceptable, the analytic procedure 
need be repeated. Most important, operations research re­
sults are prescriptive. They are dependent on descriptive 
assumptions and the following warning is ever present: 
The mathematical methods do not claim to pro­
vide answers to problems. They merely state that if 
problem can be put into certain mathematical forms, 
then the answers are those provided by the method. 
The caveat "if" is sometimes overlooked, leading 
enthusiasts to claim that their solutions are what 
decision-makers should rely upon, while the method 
may not at all be applicable to the problem (31, 
p. 28) . 
The positive or normative interpretation of the results rests 
with the decision maker. The results may simply reflect what 
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is or would be based on the premises of the model. Such a 
positive or descriptive interpretation is quite different 
from a normative view which accepts the results as the 
course of action that ought to be followed based on a judg­
mental view of the premises of the model. In either case, 
model results cannot supplant management decisions. 
Financial Intermediation 
and Operations Research 
While the main emphasis of this section will be on 
mathematical programming models, collected papers describing 
the use of operations research in banking and finance by 
Cohen and Hammer (41) and Eilon and Fowkes (53) illustrate 
the wide range of mathematical techniques used in financial 
management problems. Additionally, econometric models have 
been developed representing financial markets and the finan­
cial intermediaries systems.^ The Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn 
Model was used to analyze the potential far-reaching effects 
of the Hunt Commission recommendations (166). In general, 
however, econometric modeling is less well suited for assess­
ing the impact on local markets of potential technological 
and institutional changes than is a mathematical programming 
See (60, 90, 117, 124, 149, 180, 181). For applica­
tions to the agricultural sector, see (22, 59, 76, 115, 133, 
153) . 
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formulation. However, econometrics can be of value in con­
junction with mathematical programming techniques, and the 
importance of this connection will become apparent. 
Mathematical programming applications to financial 
markets have followed closely the divergent developments of 
linear programming. As Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow (49, 
p. 4) point out, linear programming applications have pro­
ceeded in two directions. The first, led by research efforts 
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, concentrates on 
modeling the managerial aspects of the firm. The second has 
been the application to economic theory led by T.C. Koopman's 
general equilibrium analysis. Nearly all the work which has 
been completed in finance and banking has been directed at 
the conduct, responsiveness, and productivity of individual 
financial intermediaries. No doubt this is due in part to 
the operational or tactical aspects of the problems. They 
are more readily funded since they have an immediate payoff 
2 
to the concerned intermediary. Limited work has been done 
^Econometric analysis can be used to provide much of 
the data support for mathematical programming models: demand 
functions, cost and production coefficients, etc. 
2 
In a sense,there has been an implicit narrow defini­
tion of operations research develop in OR application to 
finance. In fact, at one point in the short history of opera­
tions research, it was very narrowly defined in terms of 
applications and mathematical techniques and resulted in the 
evolution of Management Science as a related discipline. Now 
the terminologies operations research and management science 
are used interchangeably (41). 
40 
in modeling a nationwide financial intermediation system. 
The empirical work that has been completed has been cast in 
both a general equilibrium framework and in a planning 
context. 
After conducting an exhaustive review of post-World 
War II literature in agricultural finance and capital markets, 
Brake and Melichar concluded: 
. . . that the literature has been disproportion­
ately oriented to describing specific institutions— 
particularly lending institutions—rather than to 
improving the understanding of rural financial mar­
kets in a broader sense, including markets for 
savings and debt and equity instruments (26, p. 470). 
They found that empirical models of rural commercial banks 
have been completed, but that, "rural financial intermedia­
tion systems as a whole, however, have yet to be modeled" 
(26, p. 466). These findings parallel the applications of 
operations research to banking and finance in general. 
Models of individual intermediaries 
Most applications of mathematical programming to 
financial intermediation have been confined to the operational 
activities of individual commercial banks. Two main model 
types have evolved; (1) portfolio selection models emanating 
from the initial work by Markowtiz, and (2) asset management 
models first reflected in a linear programming framework by 
Chambers and Charnes. 
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Portfolio selection models 
In 1952, Markowitz (118) presented the now classic 
mean-variance (E-V) approach to portfolio selection. The 
objective is to determine the set of efficient portfolios, 
such that each efficient portfolio is characterized by the 
lowest variance of return for a given expected return or the 
greatest expected return for a given variance. A simple 
quadratic programming model description follows: 
Max ÀE-V = X Y M . X .  -  Y  T  X . X .  S.. 
^ 1 1  4  4  1  ]  1 ]  
Subject to % = 1 
X. > 0 for all i (2.1) 1 — 
where; 
= expected return from security i 
X. = proportion of portfolio invested in 
^ security i 
S..= covariance between the return from security 
i and return from security j; variance for 
i=j . 
For each value of A ^ 0, the solution to the quadratic 
programming problem yields an efficient portfolio. The 
problem of selecting the utility maximizing X remains and 
thereby a single choice from the set of efficient 
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portfolios.^ Sharps (146), hypothesizing that the return on 
a security can be linearly related to the value of a general 
market index, offered a simplified version of the model and 
correspondingly more efficient computational procedures. 
Using the basic E-V model, Chen (37) gave the port­
folio selection problem a broader interpretation within a 
model of a commercial bank. Portfolio selection of securi­
ties was generalized to asset selection: choice of cash to 
hold, investments in securities, loans to be granted, and 
investments in fixed assets. A single period quadratic 
programming model maximizing E-V wealth at the end of the 
planning horizon was hypothesized. Allowance was made for 
stochastic deposit withdrawal and an explicit probabilistic 
constraint was introduced to specify the probability that 
stochastic net deposit withdrawals were met by the value of 
the bank's portfolio at the end of the period. The model 
was extended to a multiperiod dynamic programming model. 
No empirical results were given. 
More recently Robinson and Barry (143) conducted an 
2 
empirical analysis of a commercial bank in Texas. An 
efficient E-V set was generated using quadratic programming. 
^See for example (143). 
2 
The bank had approximately $25 million in assets. 
The time period of the model was three months. 
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A utility maximizing portfolio was determined from the 
efficient set and was used as a basis for sensitivity 
analysis. The methodology was presented as a means to ex­
plore the effects of a variety of policy proposals—e.g., 
government guarantee of loans, secondary markets for farm 
loans, changing borrowing practices and interest bearing 
demand deposits—through resulting changes in risk, 
liquidity and profitability components of bank assets and 
liabilities. They concluded that bank portfolio response 
may not be trivial to changes in deposit costs, expected 
rates of return, variances, loan to deposit feedback rates, 
and risk aversion. 
Asset management models 
Asset management models are concerned with an 
institution's optimal liability, asset and capital structure 
choices. First formulated as a linear programming problem 
by Chambers and Charnes in 1959 (32), such models have the 
general linear programming form. 
The planning horizon may be single or multi-period. The 
linear objective function (2.2a) might take a number of 
max U (Xj^ . . . X^) 
subject to %A^jXj £ bj^ Vi=l ... m 
X. > 0 Vj=l . . . n 
3 -
(2.2a) 
(2.2b) 
(2.2c) 
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forms—e.g. profit, value of stockholders' equity at the 
end of the planning period, present value of net income 
plus realized capital gains, realized and unrealized tax 
adjusted gross revenue and so on. The vector of decision 
variables (2.2c) represents liability, asset, and capital 
activities. The linear constraint structure (2.2b) includes 
restrictions imposed by government regulatory and supervi­
sory bodies, market limitations, and management imposed 
behavioral and policy restrictions. Major contributions 
are briefly described below. 
The model by Chambers and Charnes was a multiperiod 
simultaneous analysis of a commercial bank's asset and 
liability structure. Constraints represented regulatory 
requirements on bank reserves and liquidity considerations 
based on Federal Reserve examiners criteria of what 
constitutes a reasonably safe portfolio. The emphasis was 
on illustrating the trade-off between optimal yield and 
liquidity considerations. 
Waterman and Gee (175) discussed the importance 
of uncertainties in loan demand and interest rates and sug­
gested the use of Bayesian statistics for such problems. 
Although the model ignored intertemporal aspects of bank 
decisions and considered only fixed liabilities, it repre­
sented an operational empirical model with fourteen asset 
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categories and twenty-three constraints reflecting past 
practices, historical patterns, legal restraints and manage­
ment policies. 
The first detailed report of a complex analytical 
model, developed and implemented by the Management Science 
Group at New York's Banker's Trust Company, was given by 
Cohen and Hammer (40) in 1967. The model considered three 
possible criteria over a multiperiod planning horizon: 
(1) maximum value of stockholders' equity during the final 
period, (2) maximum present value of net income plus 
realized capital gains over the entire planning period, and 
(3) a combination of the above two criteria. The model ex­
tended the constraint structure from the liquidity con­
straints used by Chambers and Charnes to include availability 
constraints (e.g. heuristic limits on selected ratios to 
ensure bank safety and liquidity), market restrictions (e.g., 
liquidity buffer, legal reserve requirements and corres­
pondent relationships) and intertemporal constraints (e.g. 
intertemporal linkages, endogenous capital changes, and 
loan-deposit feedback mechanisms). 
Another important empirical effort was reported by 
Robertson (142). This multiperiod model was designed, imple­
mented and used in conjunction with a top management com­
mittee to allocate assets at the Industrial National Bank 
of Rhode Island. The model maximized undiscounted profit 
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and included linear constraints on available sources of 
funds, loan demands, capital adequacy, limits on certain 
variables groups, asset-deposit feedback relationships, tax 
considerations, and traditional banking ratios. In addition, 
it incorporated integer constraints reflecting intertemporal 
fixed costs, mixed integer switching conditions in some 
asset categories and an assets equal liabilities budget 
constraints. 
More theoretically oriented models have been devel­
oped explicitly to treat probabilistic constraints. Charnes 
and Littlechild (35) , Charnes and Thore (36) , and Fried (62) 
applied chance constrained programming. An example of the 
constraint types considered in this method is illustrated by 
a gradually increasing difficulty in borrowing: prob 
(borrowing £ 3) ^  (36, p. 650) . 
Cohen and Thore (42) and Crane (43) extended these 
concepts to a dynamic context by using two-stage programming 
under uncertainty. With this method each constraint with an 
uncertain right-hand side is replaced with a set of linear 
constraints—one for each discrete value of the right-hand 
side. Crane, for example, treated future cash flows and 
interest rates as random variables. 
The applications of asset management models to a 
rural environment have been limited. Frey (61) developed 
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a linear programming model for a rural commercial bank. 
The multiperiod model considered endogenous capital, loan-
deposit feedbacks and both asset and liability management. 
Hutson (81) developed a model of a rural Oklahoma commer­
cial bank in an effort to evaluate alternative external 
sources of funds as a means for providing additional loanable 
funds. Barry and Hopkin (9) presented a more extensive 
descriptive model of the asset and liability management of 
a rural bank. Particular attention was given to the extent, 
timing and method of estimating feedback relationships. 
Most recently, Fieletz and Loeffler (58) developed a usable 
mathematical programming model for a medium to large com­
mercial bank. The model was designed to optimize after-tax 
profit as a result of liquidity management—choice of sources 
and uses of funds—subject to institutional and managerial 
considerations. 
Echols and Elliott (52) completed a detailed compari­
son of the predictive problem in parameter identification 
versus the allocational problem in bank asset management 
models. The predictive structure used included fourteen 
econometric equations and the programming model contained 
thirty-two variables and twenty-eight constraints. The model 
was applied to a national bank with from $100 to $500 million 
in total deposits. They concluded: 
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. . . that the scope of the predictive problem is 
larger compared to the allocational problem in bank 
resource allocation. In our experience, the value 
of the optimizing logic of our programming structure 
is reduced due to the predictive errors in future 
interest ratio, loan demand and deposit levels (52, 
p. 294) . 
In conclusion, a number of observations can be made; 
1. While the theoretical concepts of both the 
quadratic programming (E-V maximization) and linear program­
ming approaches to asset and liability management are gen­
erally applicable to a wide range of intermediaries, empirical 
applications have been almost exclusively to commercial banks. 
2. Models have evolved into detailed representations 
of firms' internal decisions and external linkages, and rigor­
ous models have been implemented in the banking sector. 
3. Relatively greater emphasis has been on asset 
management than on liability management. 
4. While recent studies concluded that the optimi­
zation structure of the models is greatly affected by uncer­
tainties in deposit flows, interest rates, loan demands, 
etc., no effort has been made explicitly to treat the firm's 
market powers to influence those quantities. 
5. It would appear desirable to take advantage of 
the experiences and successes of modeling individual finan­
cial firms when developing a model to gauge the effect on 
local financial markets of potential changes in the financial 
system. 
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Models of the financial intermediation system 
The only mathematical programming formulations of 
a system of financial intermediaries have been presented 
in conjunction with development of a programming model for 
national credit budgeting in Norway (162). The methodology 
has evolved into a model type^ which the authors call 
Programming of Flow-of-Funds Networks (PFOFN). 
Thore (157) introduced the concept of translating 
2 3 
traditional multiplier models and flow-of-funds tables 
into a network characterization in order to study the propa­
gation of streams of money and credit in an economy. The 
simple network representation consisted of nodes defining 
economic agents—the general public, commercial banks, and 
other financial intermediaries—and links allowing changes 
in financial flows over the network which maximized profits 
of the economic agents subject to (1) Kirchhoff conditions 
requiring the sum into a node to equal the sum flowing from 
the node and (2) capacitating constraints establishing limits 
^Charnes and Cooper (34, p. 30) call often used model 
structure and solution techniques model types and point out 
most actual applications are usually a mixture of one or more 
model types. PFOFN are characterized by elements from net­
work theory, portfolio theory and decomposition theory (159) . 
2 See for example (147). 
^For agricultural sector applications, see the survey 
by Brake and Melichar (26). 
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on certain flows. The pulsation of cash streams through 
the network was initiated by an exogenous cash influx and 
leakages from the system were in terms of excess reserves 
held by the intermediaries. Thore (158) extended the model 
to include uncertainty, allowing random movements in deposits 
by the general public at financial intermediaries. Subsequent 
work by Thore and Kydland (161) reformulated the network 
representation emphasizing the decentralization properties of 
the model. The ultimate sector—source and user of funds— 
represented the source and sink of the network. The inter­
mediaries—nodes--were considered to solve individual 
portfolio optimization problems which were embedded in a 
larger global optimization problem. In the global problem, 
portfolios were linked by market clearing conditions. The 
dynamic properties of the credit network and conditions under 
which the dynamic process converged were considered.^ These 
embryonic forms of PFOFN were illustrated by simple model 
prototypes and some numeric examples intended to illustrate 
solution procedures. 
Story, Thore and Boyer (154) have presented a general 
statement of PFOFN. The network representation of the 
^The ultimate sector was considered to use funds in 
one period. After leakages in terms of desired cash holdings, 
a portion of the funds flowed back into the intermediaries. 
The process continued in a manner analogous to dynamic credit 
multiplier analyses (161). 
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financial intermediation process is analogous to flow-of-
credit diagrams. There are (m+n) nodes in the network: m 
intermediaries or investor portfolios and n markets for fi­
nancial instruments. The ultimate sector is considered to 
issue net debt instruments at nominal amounts d^ (j=l . . .n) 
and to provide available funds to the intermediaries in the 
amounts R^(i=l . . .m). Each investor or intermediary solves 
an optimization problem similar to (2.2); 
max U^(X^) 
S't £ b^ set of linear constraints repre­
senting government, market and 
internal management restrictions 
px^ £ budget constraint or Kirchhoff 
condition at portfolio nodes 
x^ > 0 (2.3) 
where 
U^iX^) is the intermediary's objective function 
X^ = (X^. . . X^) is the vector of intermediary's 
asset holding, i.e. linkages 
between portfolio and market 
nodes 
p = (p^. . . p^) is the vector of asset prices 
is matrix of constraint 
coefficients 
b^ is vector of constraint right 
hand sides 
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The individual portfolio problems are coupled by market 
clearing conditions; 
= d. j=l. . .n Kirchhoff condition at market 
i ^ ^ nodes 
The individual problems can thus be embedded in a global 
master problem: 
i i 
max Z U (X^) 
i 
s.t. A^X^ < b^ Vi=l. . .m 
px^ <_ Vi=l. . .m 
x^ ^  0 Vi=l. . .m 
Z X^ = d. Vj=l. . .n (2.4) 
i ] ] 
This model has the familiar decomposition characteristics 
but is formed through the reverse process of embedding 
individual portfolio problems in a larger master problem.^ 
If the objective function of the individual prob­
lems is strictly concave and each choice set is a convex 
polyhedron, then there exists a set of equilibrium prices. 
That is a vector of prices which satisfies market clearing 
conditions and which, when delegated to individual inter­
mediaries, results in optimal asset selections in the 
In decomposition one is usually trying to decompose 
a larger problem into smaller problems in order to facili­
tate solution. See (48, 111). 
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individual problems and, in total, yields an optimal solu­
tion to the global master problem. Story, et al. sketch an 
elaborate institutional framework introducing dealers who 
"make markets" in the financial instruments and by their 
actions determine the set of equilibrium prices (154). By 
adjusting the initial set of prices, both optimal asset 
selections and general equilibrium prices can be endoge­
nous ly determined using the model. 
In the case of linear objective functions—e.g., 
CX^ where C = (C^ . . . C^) vector of net returns—no such 
unique equilibrium need exist. Story et al. offer an 
algorithm directed at finding a vector of net returns which 
yields unique optima in the individual problems and mini­
mizes the sum of excess demand and excess supply in the n 
asset markets. 
The model has been applied to aggregate financial 
allocation problems in Norway (162). Two markets exist; 
treasury bills and bonds. The ultimate sector consists of 
the domestic private sector and the foreign sector. Six 
portfolio nodes are included; each represents the aggregate 
behavior of one intermediary type in the economy; (1) com­
mercial banks, (2) savings banks, (3) insurance companies 
and other private financial institutions, (4) state banks, 
(5) postal savings system, and (6) social security funds. 
The model consists of 96 variables and 89 constraints. 
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Using current market prices^ and maximizing individual port­
folio choice, both asset markets resulted in disequilibrium. 
An estimate of equilibrium prices—market clearing prices— 
was made. 
Thore (160) generalized the model to include 
liability management and introduced the concept of interest 
rate responsive demand functions for desired investments and 
2 desired issues by the ultimate sector. Contrary to earlier 
efforts which concentrated on the profit maximization be­
havior of individual intermediaries, emphasis was given in 
this generalization to efficient intermediation in terms of 
the global problem. Prices (net returns) were considered 
targets and the solution to the global problem (2.4) was the 
objective. The basic assumption was that financial inter­
mediaries will look for an efficient consolidated portfolio 
and in general will act in accord or can be made to act in 
accord with the global solution. 
In an attempt to represent better the institutional 
setting in Norway and to identify adequately targets and 
instruments, Thore developed a goal programming extension 
^The analysis was completed for a "1971 like" 
economic environment. 
2 While both these important concepts were suggested, 
no attempt was made to implement them empirically. 
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of the empirical model discussed above.^ Interest rates were 
given as targets and fixed in the model. Credit ceilings 
for direct loans and funding floors for government bonds were 
formulated as goals in the model. Monetary and credit poli­
cies were incorporated in the constraint structure. 
The work by Thore and coauthors has been an important 
and exclusive effort to develop a methodology to examine the 
impact of policy alternatives on a national financial system 
as a whole. They have advantageously capitalized on more 
than a generation of experiences in modeling financial firm 
activities. However, there seem to be two essential features 
missing from their methodology which prevent realistic exten­
sion to local financial markets: (1) it is necessary to 
allow for market interactions and financial intermediary 
competition in the source of funds markets, and (2) it is 
necessary to evaluate the effects of alternatives to perfect 
competition which is less likely in local financial markets 
than in national markets. 
A New Direction 
The preceding sections of chapter 2 provide a basis 
for a concise problem statement and description of the 
^Goal programming was introduced by Charnes and 
Cooper (34). See Lee (112) for a detailed presentation of 
goal programming methodology and application. 
56 
general approach to solving that problem considered in this 
dissertation. 
Problem statement 
A multitude of proposed policy and structural changes 
face U.S. financial markets. Specific proposals have been 
directed at local agricultural markets. To a large extent, 
the proposals are meant to supplement an existing structure 
of legislative and regulatory restrictions which have evolved 
in the interest of balancing competition and soundness in the 
U.S. financial system. The proposed changes can be cate­
gorized broadly into three areas: (1) transformation of the 
productive capabilities of individual intermediaries through 
changes in their structural form and in the activities in 
which they may engage; (2) increased reliance on the market 
place through removal of price control regulations; and (3) 
increasing efficiency in the many channels or linkages be­
tween markets and intermediaries through which credit flows 
from suppliers to ultimate users of surplus funds in the 
economy. There has been no systematic examination of the 
effects of these many proposed changes or of the impact of 
their piecemeal enactment on local financial markets. 
Mathematical programming models have been widely 
used to reflect the operational activity of individual 
financial intermediaries. Some modeling has proceeded, in 
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an extremely aggregate form, at the national level in Norway. 
However, a methodological and applications void exists in 
modeling local financial markets. 
The problem is to develop a general analytic frame­
work for policy analyses in local financial markets in 
general and specifically in rural agricultural markets. The 
methodology should be able to consider the detailed specifi­
cations of activities of financial intermediaries, the unique 
demand and supply characteristics of local financial markets, 
and the flow of funds throughout the many linkages forming 
the financial intermediation process in local markets. 
To the extent that financial intermediaries can be 
viewed as producing units effecting the flow of credit through 
the financial system by acquisition, creation, and allocation 
of asset and liability instruments, spatial price and allo­
cation models can provide a conceptual and mathematical basis 
for modeling local financial markets. 
An approach 
Spatial price and allocation models are used to 
analyze allocation and pricing policies and problems over time 
and space. The development of operational models has 
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proceeded since 1940.^ The genesis of empirical models is 
the classical transportation model first formulated inde­
pendently by Hitchcock in 1941 (78) and Kontorovich in 1942 
and reformulated in linear programming form by Koopmans 
in 1949 (104). Even this basic model can be used to reflect 
many of the elements of the financial intermediation process. 
Efficient financial intermediation could be viewed as 
meeting demand for credit at minimum cost; 
m n 
Minimize E Z c. . X. . 
i=l j=l 
n 
Subject to E X.. £ a. for every i=l. . .m 
j=l ^ 
m 
E X.. 2 b- every j=l. . .n 
i=l J 
X . .  > 0  f o r  e v e r y  i = l .  .  . m ;  
j=l. . .n 
Where X^^ represents the flow of funds from i, one of m 
sources of funds supply points, to j, one of n uses of funds 
demand points. 
c^j represents the unit cost of the flow X^j. 
a^ represents funds availability at i (known supply), 
International trade economists have provided over 
a century of major contributions to generalization of eco­
nomical equilibrium theory to include spatially and tempor­
ally separated economic activities. Takayama and Judge (156) 
provide an historical sketch of those theoretical works from 
Thunen, 1826, to Kemp, 1964. 
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e.g., demand and time deposits at commercial banks, time 
deposits and savings accounts at thrift institutions, ac­
crued reserves of life insurance companies, etc. 
bj represents funds demanded at j (known demand), 
e.g., government and corporate securities, loans, mortgages, 
etc. 
In 1951, Enke (55), using an electric analogue com­
puter, formulated an empirical model to determine equilibrium 
prices as well as commodity movements when a number of buyers 
and sellers trade a homogeneous good in spatially separated 
markets. Enke's model used linear demand relations and unit 
transportation costs independent of flow volume. However, 
the model allowed for generalization to include nonlinear 
demand and flow dependent transportation costs. Samuelson 
(144) reformulated the Enke model in 1952 as a mathematical 
programming problem and demonstrated that the Hitchcock-
Koopmans transportation model was a special case of the 
Enke model. 
Beckmann and Marschak (14) combined the activity 
analysis formulation of Koopmans and the interregional or 
spatial aspects of the Samuelson model. In addition, they 
extended the concept of allocation to include both production 
and allocation activities. Takayama and Judge (155) ex­
tended the Beckmann-Marshack model to a quadratic programming 
form which allowed endogenous determination of commodity 
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prices as well as flow quantities and imputed prices for 
intermediate products and primary resources. Plessner (136) 
provided an alternative quadratic programming specification 
which allowed for more general empirical estimates of demand 
than assumed by Takayama and Judge. This formulation has been 
successfully used in the agricultural sector to analyze 
pricing outcomes and commodity flows between various mar­
kets and geographic regions and to analyze the implications 
of policy restrictions on the pricing and flow outcomes. 
The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to 
developing a variation of the Plessner specification which 
can serve as a basis for a systematic method for analyses 
of local financial intermediation, and to conducting an 
initial econometric analysis into the supply of funds to 
and demand for funds at commercial banks in Iowa. 
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CHAPTER III. A SPATIAL PRICE AND ALLOCATION ACTIVITY 
ANALYSIS MODEL FOR LOCALIZED FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: PERFECT COMPETITION MODEL 
The familiar structure of spatial price and alloca­
tion models accommodates the essential characteristics 
of the financial intermediation process. The perfect com­
petition model is presented in this chapter in order to 
illustrate the methodology, introduce notation and serve 
as a basis for extensions to more representative models 
of local financial markets. The perfect competition model 
can be used to reflect most of the important flow of funds 
linkages in local financial markets. Subsequent modification 
to include policy and regulatory constraints provides a 
mechanism for modeling imperfections of government inter­
vention and institutional policies—perhaps representing 
risk considerations. Since these constraints alone do 
not allow the flexibility needed to adequately represent 
market power of intermediaries in local markets, subsequent 
chapters consider model extensions necessary to reflect 
market pricing imperfections. The model gives a prescriptive 
paradigm for modeling flow of funds and pricing outcomes 
in localized financial markets and it is dependent on a 
number of descriptive assumptions. 
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Scenario 
Financial intermediaries are characterized as firms 
engaging in two product lines: liability management, acquir­
ing funds by issuing claims on themselves; and asset manage­
ment, allocating funds by acquiring claims on others. In 
so doing, these firms facilitate the flow of funds from 
surplus to demanding units in the economy. 
The model of financial intermediation presented 
represents a sector or proper subset of the financial system 
in a partial equilibrium context. It is assumed that the 
source and use of funds markets in which intermediaries 
operate can be identified and that the relationships repre­
senting supply and demand for funds by the nonfinancial 
units of the economy remain stable within the realm of 
firm operations and alternatives being considered. Focus 
is on the role of intermediaries in equating sector supply 
and use of funds. 
The intermediaries are linked to one another by 
competition in source and use of funds markets, by 
competition for nonfunds resources, and by interfirm 
transfer of funds. They have no market power and are 
assumed to maximize net revenue in a perfect competition 
environment. The model is initially formulated with no 
government intervention or policy restrictions and then 
modified to include policy and regulatory constraints. 
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The activities of a typical intermediary are illus­
trated in figure 3.1. Mathematically, the intermediary is 
considered to create a single intermediate product which 
INTERMEDIARY (j): E.G., COMMERCIAL BANK, 
CREDIT UNION, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, ETC. 
Liability management 
Claims 
^jieq 
e.g., demand deposits, 
time deposits, etc. 
^io6r ^ 
e.g., exogenous 
borrowing, etc. 
j0s 
e.g. , 
required 
or cash 
reserves, 
etc. 
'jkes 
Asset management 
Claims 
^jhen 
e.g., business loans, 
commercial and residen­
tial mortgages, farm 
loans, consumer instal­
ments, commercial and 
government securities, 
etc. 
'kjes 
E.g., compensating balances, inter­
bank loans, loan participations, etc 
Figure 3,1. Basic intermediary activities 
represents the balance sheet function of equating funds ob­
tained from acquisition activities and funds allocated to 
alternative uses. 
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The intermediaries acquire funds by competing in 
spatially separate source of funds markets where funds 
supply is defined by linear supply relationships. In these 
markets, the model describes market equilibrium through 
endogenous determination of optimal price and funds supply 
quantities. In addition, the intermediary can acquire 
funds in markets or from firm unique sources with a known 
supply of available funds. Finally, funds are acquired 
as a result of transfer activities among intermediaries. 
Funds are allocated, internally to uses such as 
required or cash reserves, transferred to other inter­
mediaries, and allocated to spatially separate and competive 
asset markets. Demand for funds in these markets may be 
represented by known demand quantities or be given by linear 
demand relationships. As in the source markets, the model 
endogenously determines optimal price and use of funds 
quantities in these latter markets. 
Intermediaries are assumed to use known supplies 
of nonfunds resources in acquisition, transfer, and alloca­
tion activities. Nonfunds resources may be unique to the 
firm or be acquired in competitive markets. 
Notation 
Asset markets 
h = 1,2,..., H separate use of funds markets. 
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m, n = 1,2,..., N type of funds demand, e.g., business 
loans, commercial and residential mortgages, etc. 
Y = ^12'"""' ^ IN' ^ 21'***' ^ hn' '' where 
is market h demand for funds type n. 
A"fiY is a system of linear demand relationships, where the 
demand price for funds type n in market h is given 
^ ' i"hnm i'tan. 
A = ^12' " '' ^ hn' *' w^ere is the constant 
term in the demand price relationship for type n 
funds demand in market h. 
0 is a matrix of demand coefficients dimensioned (HN) x (HN). 
Letting represent the demand price for funds 
type n in market h, (J^^nm the (h-l)N + m th 
element of the (h-l)N + nth row of Q. and is equal 
3ehn 
to ~ — nonspecified elements are zero. 
^hm 
A = 612' •••' '^hn' •••' ' where 6^^ is the imputed 
market equilibrium price in use of funds market h 
for funds type n. 
L Y  is an (HN) X ( HN) identity matrix. 
Liability markets 
1 = 1,2, L separate source of funds market where the 
supply price is given as a linear function of the 
quantity of funds supplied. 
p, q = 1,2, ..., Q type of funds supply, e.g., demand and 
time deposits, etc. 
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Z — (z^^f ^12' •••» ^IQ' ^21' •••' ^iq' •••' 
Zj^g is market 1 supply of funds type g. 
n+$Z is a system of linear supply relationships, where the 
supply price for funds type q in market 1 is given 
"iq + I  •iqp^p. 
n = (tt 22 I  TT 22 '  . • . r TT 2g ' ^21' ***' ^  2q ' • • • ' 
TT2q is the constant term in the supply price rela­
tionship for funds type q in market 1. 
$ is a matrix of supply coefficients dimensioned (LQ)x(LQ). 
Letting e2q represent the supply price for funds 
in market 1, is the (1-1)Q + pth element of 
3e 
the (1-1)Q + gth row of $ and is equal to % non-
^^19 
specified elements are zero. 
r = (Yii' ^ 12' ^IQ' ^ 21' •'*' ^ Iq' ***' ^ LQ*' where A2q 
is the imputed market equilibrium price in source 
of funds market 1 for funds type q. 
G = 1, 2, 0 separate markets or sources with known 
available supply of funds unique to a single inter­
mediary or available to several intermediaries, 
r = 1, 2, ..., R type of known available funds supply, e.g., 
exogenous borrowing, capital account, etc. 
£! = ^^11' ^12' *•*' ®1R' • • • ' ^or ' ' ' ' t ' w^®re 
the known available supply of funds type r at source 
o. 
is an (LQ)x(LQ) identity matrix. 
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Nonfunds resources markets 
F = (f^, fg, —, —/ fy)', where is the known 
available quantity of resource u. Resources may 
be available to a number of intermediaries in compe­
tition or unique to a single intermediary. 
I = oTg, Cy) , where is the imputed 
value of nonfunds resource u. 
Intermediaries 
i,k = If 2, J intermediaries, e.g., commercial banks, 
savings and loan associations, production credit 
associations, etc. 
^ " (*1181' *1182' •••' *1160' *1261' •••' *]18q' ' ' 
Wjl6q)'/ where Wj^g^ is acquisition of funds type q 
from market 1 by intermediary j — using process 6. 
^ ^  (^1161' ^ 1162' •••' ^ llÔR' ^ 1281' ^J06R^'' 
Vjo6r is acquisition of funds type r from source o 
by intermediary j — using process 8. 
^ (*1161' *1182' ••*' *118N' *1261' *]h8n' ' " 
' , where is allocation of funds type n 
to market h by intermediary j — using process 6. 
^ " (^1181' ^ 1182' •*•' ^ 118S' ^1281' tjkGs' tjRQg) 
where t.,. is the transfer of funds type s to 
JKU S 
intermediary k by intermediary j — using process 
6. Type of funds transfer is given by s = 1, 2, ..., 
S, e.g., compensating balances, interbank loans. 
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etc. Internally allocated funds are given by 
tji^es e.g., required or cash reserves, etc. 
0 is a set of processes. For notational convenience activi­
ties are assumed to be of a single process; inter­
mediaries could be modeled to have a number of 
candidate processes for a given acquisition, alloca­
tion or transfer activity. 
D = (d d_, ..., d., ..., d_) ' , where d. is the initial 
12 J J ] 
quantity of funds available for allocation at inter­
mediary j. 
Y = •••' 4^ j f •••' ' ' where is the imputed 
value of funds available for allocation at inter­
mediary j. 
^ _ / w w w w w 
^w ~ •••' CilGO'  ^ 1201' •••' CjiQq, '.', 
Cjl0q) ', where c^^^^ is the explicit unit costs 
associated with acquisition activity Wj^g^. 
C _ , V V V V V 
" ^ ^1101' ^1102' •••' °ii0R' ^ 1201' •••' °jo0r' •••' 
Cjo0r)*/ where cY^g^ is the explicit unit costs 
associated with acquisition activities Vj^g^. 
Costs could include a known cost of funds, e.g., 
interest rate on borrowing, in addition to trans­
action costs. 
„ _ , X X X X X 
x ^°liei' 1102' •••' 116N' 1201' °jh0h' ' 
CjH0j^) ', where is the explicit unit costs 
associated with allocation activity Xj^On" Costs 
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could include transaction costs as well as 
transformation costs, associated with altering 
the liquidity and risk characteristics of funds. 
't ^^1101' ^1162' •••' °lies' ^ 1281' •••' CjkGs' 
Cjj^eg) ' / where Cj^^^ is the explicit unit cost 
associated with activity tj^g^. For j ^  k, ct^^^ 
t t 
can be thought of as the net cost,+ °kjk9s^' 
associated with transfer activity tj^g^. The ex­
plicit net cost of funds transfer activities may 
be negative (i.e., net return). For example, 
letting t.,Q be an interbank loan from intermediary 
3Ku S 
j to intermediary k, might be a return to 
intermediary j — such as transaction costs minus 
interest received from intermediary k. At the same 
time might represent costs to intermediary 
k — such as transaction costs plus interest rate 
payment to intermediary j. 
is an (HN)x(JHN) matrix which can be partitioned into J 
adjacent (HN)x(HN) identity matrices. The matrix 
reflects efficiency in allocation, i.e., a dollar 
allocated to asset markets uses a dollar of avail­
able funds. 
P^, P^ are respectively (LQ)x(JLQ) and (OR)x(JOR) matrices 
which can be partitioned into J adjacent (LQ)x(LQ) 
and (OR)x(OR) matrices. They represent efficiency 
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in acquisition, i.e., a dollar acquired in source 
markets results in a dollar of funds available for 
allocation. 
A^, are respectively Ux(JHN), Ux(JLQ), Ux(JOR), 
and U^, (JJS) matrices which reflect technical effi­
ciency in nonfunds resource use. Intermediary j 
use of resource u is given as follows: for alloca­
tion activity Xj^en' ^jhSnu' (j-l)HN + (h-l)N 
+ nth element of the uth row of A^; for acquisition 
activities Wjigg and v^^g^, by the (j-l)LQ + 
(1-1)Q + qth element of the uth row of A^ and by 
gV 
jo6ru' (j-l)OR + (o-l)R + rth element of the 
uth row of A^; for internal allocation activity 
tjjQg, by ajjQgy the (j-l)JS + (j-l)S + sth element 
of the uth row of A^; and finally for transfer 
activity tjkgg, by + 4jkesu' 
sum of intermediary j and intermediary k use of re­
source u, the (j-l)JS + (k-l)S + sth element of the 
uth row of A^. 
M^, are respectively Jx(JHN), Jx(JLQ), Jx(JOR) 
and Jx(JJS). They reflect efficiency in the inter­
mediaries balance sheet activities. The (j-l)HN + 1 
to (j-l)HN + HN elements of the jth row of are 
equal to 1. The (j-l)LQ + 1 to (j-l)LQ + LQ ele­
ments of the jth row of are equal to -1. Simi-
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larly, the (j-l)OR + 1 to (j-l)OR + OR elements of 
the jth row of are equal to -1. For the 
(j-l)JS + 1 to (j-l)JS + JS elements of the jth 
row are equal to 1; the (k-l) JS + (j-l)S + 1 to 
(k-l)JS + (j-l)S + S elements of the jth row of 
are equal to -1, for k ^ j. All other elements of 
the matrices are equal to zero. 
Policy and regulatory constraints 
B^, B^, B^ are respectively Bx(JHN), Bx(JLQ), Bx(JOR) 
and Bx(JJS) matrices of technical coefficients in 
policy and regulatory constraints, where the co-
efficients of and t in the 
3th policy or regulatory constraint are respectively 
bjh0n3' (j-l)HN + (h-l)N + nth element of the 
3th row of B^; bjiQqg' the (j-l)LQ + (l-l)Q + qth 
element of the 3th row of B^; the (j-l)OR + 
(o-l)R + rth element of the 3th row of B^; and 
the (j-l)JS + (k-l)S + sth element of the 3th row 
of B^. 
G = (g^, g^, ggf ... gg)', where g^ is the right hand 
side of the 3th policy or regulatory constraint. 
K = (k^, <2/ Kg, . ., Kg), where is the imputed 
unit cost of the 3th policy or regulatory constraint. 
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Mathematical Model 
Objective function 
The objective function is to maximize net revenue 
for the financial section being modeled: 
Maximize 
I 
h (^^^hn^hn ^ ^^ "^hnm^hm) ^hn) 
IIIc 
jhn jh0n^jh0n 
~ ^^^^jo0r"^joer ; 
"I II ]t 
j k?^i s jjkGs kjkGsJ jkSs 
~ j s ^ ii8s ^jj6s 
- I ^4 d. ] ] 
-  I I  ^  
o  r  
e  
o r  or 
- Î % 
- 1 1 5  
h n hn 
0 -% I Y 
1 q iq 
gross revenue from assets 
explicit allocation costs 
explicit acquisition 
costs 
cost of liabilities 
explicit transfer costs 
explicit internal 
allocation costs 
imputed cost of initially 
available funds 
imputed cost of known 
funds supply 
imputed cost of nonfunds 
resources 
(3.1) 
No funds have been a priori allocated to asset 
markets or procured in liability markets in this form of 
the model. Including constant terms in (3.2a) and (3.2b) 
could result in nonzero components in the objective function. 
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Constraint set 
The constraint set can be grouped into three con­
straint types. A series of resource balance constraints 
reflect the fact that funds and nonfunds resource use may 
not exceed supplies. A set of pricing conditions ensures 
that the unit value of an activity cannot exceed the unit 
cost of the activity—explicit unit costs plus the imputed 
value of resource use per unit of activity. Finally non-
negativity conditions allow only nonnegative activity levels. 
Resource balance Funds demanded in asset markets 
may not exceed the quantity of funds allocated to those 
markets by the intermediaries: 
^hn — I Xjhen' h=l,2,—, H and n=l,2,—, N (3.2a) 
Similarly funds acquired by intermediaries in liability 
markets or from known sources may not exceed the quantity 
of funds supplied in the liability markets or the known 
quantity of funds available: 
I ^jieq - ^Iq' L and q=l,2,..., Q (3.2b) 
1 £ ®or' 0 and r=l,2,..., R (3.2c) 
^ 3 r o 
An individual intermediary's use of funds in alloca­
tion to asset markets, internal allocation, and transfer 
to other intermediaries cannot exceed funds initially avail­
able plus funds acquired in source markets and through 
transfer from other intermediaries. These are the balance 
sheet contraints: 
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n ^ j h e n ' ^ n t j k o s l ^ j + n ^ j i e q + n v j o Q r  +  I  \ j e s  
j = l , 2 , . . . , J  ( 3 . 2 d )  
Finally, nonfunds resources used cannot exceed 
known available supplies; 
jhenu^jh0n''"l^^^equ''^jljoSru^joSr 
\ ^ ^ jk9su"''^kjk0su^^jkes''"^^j jesu^j jes—^u 
J KfJ S J S 
u = 1, 2, ... U (3.2e) 
Pricing conditions The demand price for an asset 
cannot exceed the imputed market equilibrium price: 
^hn'^^hnm^hm -  "^hn' ^  ^  *  •  •  '  "  n = l , 2 , . .. ,N 
m 
(3.2g) 
Similarly, the imputed market equilibrium price 
of a liability cannot exceed the supply price: 
Ylq^^lq+^^lqp^lp' 1=1'2,..., L and q=l,2,..., Q 
^ (3.2h) 
The imputed marginal value of funds allocated to 
asset markets cannot exceed the marginal cost of funds 
allocated. Costs include explicit allocation costs plus 
the imputed cost of available funds and the imputed cost 
of nonfunds resources: 
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— ^jh6n ^ ^ ^ ^jh9nu*^u 
j  =  1,2,... J; h  =  1 , 2 , ..., H and n = 1,2,..., N 
(3.2i) 
The imputed marginal value of funds available for 
allocation cannot exceed the unit cost of acquisition at 
each intermediary. Costs include explicit acquisition 
costs plus the imputed cost of funds from source markets 
and the imputed cost of nonfunds resources: 
u ^jiequ ^u 
j — X/2/*«af J? 1 — L âlld CJ — Q 
(3.2j) 
— ^joGr ^ ^ or ^ ^ jo0ru ^u 
j = 1 , 2 , . . . ,  J; o= 1 , 2 , . . . ,  O and r = 1,2,...,R 
(3.2k) 
Finally, the imputed marginal return from transfer 
and internal allocation activities cannot exceed the mar­
ginal costs of such activities. Costs include explicit 
activity costs, imputed costs of nonfunds resources, and 
the imputed cost of available funds at the source inter­
mediary: 
— ^*^jkj0s ^kkjes) ^ ^ ^^jkjesu ^ ^ kkj0su^ ^u'^'4c 
transfer activities k^i=l,2,... J and s=l,2,...,S 
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° - Cjies Sfjiesu "u + 
internal allocation activities 
j = l , 2 , . . . ,  J and s=l,2,..., S (3.2£) 
Nonnegativity conditions The nonnegativity con­
ditions ensure only nonnegative activity levels and imputed 
prices: 
^hn : ^iq i Xjhen ^  "jleq ^  ^joer i 
tjkes i ®hn i ^ i «or i 0 and 0^ > 0 
h=l,2,..., H; n=lf2,...f N; 1=1,2,..., L; q=l,2, 
.*., Qy ],k=l,2,«.. Jf o—1,2,... O7 r 1,2,..., Ry s—1,2,..., 
S and u=l,2,... U (3.3) 
Policy and regulatory constraints^ 
The addition of policy and regulatory restrictions 
to the model requires modification to both the objective 
function and the constraint set. The objective function is 
changed to include the imputed cost to the sector of the 
policy and regulatory constraints: 
Objective function (3.1) is modified to include 
~ I XQ  • imputed cost of constraints (3.1') 
g p e 
The policy and regulatory constraints are added: 
Rows of an activity analysis structure are normally 
thought of as using or creating a commodity. Charnes and 
Cooper (34) discuss a broader view of "commodity" to 
include policy and legal restraints which may in turn be 
productive or nonproductive. 
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^ ^ s^jk9sg tjkQs 1 9g; 3=1#2,..., B (3.2f) 
The pricing conditions must be modified to include 
per unit activity costs of policy and regulatory constraints:^ 
"^hn — ^ jhen * ^ ^  ^ jh9nu "^u ^ ^ '^jheng *^3 
j=l,2,..., J; h=l,2,..., H and n=l,2,..., N (3.2i') 
— Gjleq + Ylq + % ^jl0qu "^u | ^jl0q3 
i=l,2,..., J; 1=1,2,..., L and q=l,2,..., Q (3.2j') 
— ^joGr ^ ^ or ^ ^  ^ jo6ru ^u ^  ^ ^joGrg '^3 
j=l,2,..., J; o=l,2,..., 0 and r=l,2,..., R (3.2k') 
— (^ikj6s^^kkj8s) ^ ^ ^^jkj0su'^^kkj0su^'^u ^ ^ k ^ ^ '^kjes3 "^3 
3^^j=2./ J âixâ S—1 / 2|r»«»/ S 
and 0 < + I + I Kg 
j=l,2,..., J and s=l,2,..., S (3.2&') 
Finally, the additional nonnegativity constraints 
are added to (3.3): 
Kg ^ 0; 3 = 1,2,..., B (3.3') 
Depending on the sign of the elements of B , B , 
B , B. the constraint may increase or decrease the net 
value of the contributions of activities X, W, V, T (34). 
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Matrix notation 
The perfect competition pricing model with policy 
and regulatory constraints added can be written in the 
following matrix notation: 
Maximize (3.1') 
/ 
x' 
w 
V 
T 
A 
r 
0 0 0 0 0 -M' X 0 -^x -®x 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
-Pw M' w 
0 
-K  0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 M' 
V 
-P' 
V ~K 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -•M^ 0 
-4 -"t 0 0 
-Px 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Pw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-:z 
\ \ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
\ \ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
-V 0 0 0 0 0 —Q 0 
0 0 0 0 0 I, 0 0 0 0 0 -0 
Y 
^x" 
w Cw 
V 
T 
s 
A 0 
r 0 
Y 
H 
I 
D 
E 
F 
K G 
Y -A 
z JI -
Subject to (3.2a - 3.2h) and (3.2i' - 3.2&') 
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-, » ma 
0 0 0 0 Px 0 - M '  X 0 -4 -^x 0 0 X Cx 
0 0 0 0 0 M' w 0 - K  0 0 w 
0 0 0 0 0 0 M; -A; 
- K  
0 0 V Cy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 T Ct 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  V 0 A 0 
0 Pw 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 hH N r < 0 
\ 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 Y D 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 E 
\ 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 ï  F 
By 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 K G 
0 0 0 0 
-V 0 0 0 0 0 - Q  0 Y -A 
0 0 0 0 0 h  0 0 0 0 0 - < p .  _z. 
and nonnegativity conditions (3.3) and (3.3') 
[ X W V T A r ^ H ^ K Y Z ] ' > 0  
Model Interpretation 
The self-dual characteristics of the model (3.1', 
3.2a-3.2h, 3.2i'-3.2£', 3.3, 3.3'), can be seen in the matrix 
formulation presented in the previous section. The constraint 
matrix is skew-symmetric except for the sub matrix , 
i.e., the matrix equals the negative of its transpose. The 
constraint vector (right hand side) of the constraint set 
equals the negative of the coefficient vector of the linear 
portion of the objective function. Plessner (136) and 
Hall, Heady, Stoecker and Sposito (69) have shown that 
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models with this structure satisfy, at the optimal, condi­
tions normally associated with perfect competition.^ 
The objective function, net revenue for the finan­
cial sector being modeled, reaches its maximum at zero, 
i.e., no pure economic profits, and, if the problem has 
a feasible solution, the pricing and flow outcomes expected 
in a perfect competition environment hold at the optimal. 
If imputed market equilibrium prices in source 
and use of funds markets are positive, the normal market 
equilibrium conditions equating supply and demand for funds 
hold; 
^hn (Yhn " I ^jh0n^ = 0 ; h=l,2,...,H and n=l,2,...,N (3.4a) 
^Iq (^^jieq " ^ Iq) ~ ^ ' 1=1'2,..., L and q=l,2, ,Q(3.4b) 
^or ^ ^jo0r " ®or^ ~ ° ° and r=l,2,...,R (3.4c) 
If the imputed value (cost) of funds available 
for allocation is positive at an intermediary, then the 
balance sheet condition ensures that funds initially avail­
able to the intermediary plus funds acquired equals funds 
allocated; 
^The solution is efficient, guarantees gross and 
net profits for the sector as well as each firm (decentral­
ization) , guarantees nonpositive net profits and would 
be brought about by free market prices so as to equate 
supply and demand ( 136). Also, see McCarl and Spreen 
(116), 
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I  tkjQg) 0 
j=l,2,..., J (3.4d) 
A positive imputed market price for nonfunds re­
sources ensures that nonfunds resource use exhausts initially 
available supplies: 
jhenu^jh0n^|^^ajiequ^jl0q joBru^joer 
^ ^  vl-i e^^jjk8su*^kjk0su)^jk0s jj0su^jj0s ^u^ ~ ^ ] S Js 
u=l,2,..., u (3.4e) 
Similarly, if the imputed cost of a policy or regu­
latory constraint is positive, then the policy or regulatory 
constraint is binding: 
^B^jhi^jh0nB*ih8n jl0q3^jieq 
^|!^jo0r3^jo0r j^Osg'^jk0s ^ 
3=1,2,..., B (3.4f) 
Finally, perfect competition equilibrium pricing 
conditions are ensured. If the marginal return from an 
activity (flow of funds) is less than the marginal cost 
of the activity, the flow of funds activity level is zero. 
If the marginal return exceeds the marginal cost, the flow 
of funds activity level increases until marginal return 
and marginal cost are equal: 
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^hn ^ '^hnm^hm 
m 
h=l,2,..., H and n=l,2,..., N (3.4g) 
^Iq^^lq " ^ iq " ^  ^ iqp ~ ° 
1 = 1 , 2 , . , . ,  L and q=l,2,..., Q (3.4h) 
^jh0n (^h.n ^jhOn ^^jhSnu'^u %^]h8ng^6) = 0 
f 2 f • • m f Jf h™l f 2 f • m • f H ând ri—1 ^ 2 ^ ^ N 
(3.4i) 
*ii8q ^^j~^iq~'^ji9q~^^jiequ'^u"pji0q&'^3^ ~ ° 
j=l,2,..., J; 1=1,2,..., L and q=l,2,..., Q 
(3.4j) 
^joGr^'^j ^or ^joGr ^^joGru^u ^ 
j—1 f  2  /  •  m  •  f  J  f  0"1 f  2  •  9  •  f  0 3.n.d or—l / R 
(3.4k) 
^jkSs *°ijk8s^°kjk8s* jkesu"*'^kjk0su^ '^u 
-%bjk8se ^6 -*]' = ° 
J /  j — J  â , n â  s — X  ^  2  y  * *  #  ^  S  
tjjes ^"^jj0s"^^jjsueu " pjjesg ^3 " ° 
j=l,2,..., J and s=l,2,..., S (3.4t) 
For positive demand for funds in use of funds markets, 
conditions (3.4g and 3.4i) give the following equilibrium 
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conditions: 
^hn ^ ^hmn^hm""'^i^°ih8n^^^ jhQnu^u* ^ jhGng 
h=l,2,..., H; n=l,2,..., N and j=l,2,..., J 
That is the marginal cost of allocation of funds 
to market h funds type n is equalized across all inter­
mediaries with positive allocation activities and is equal 
to the demand price for funds type n in market h. 
For positive supply of funds in source of funds 
markets, conditions (3.4h and 3.4]) give the following 
equilibrium conditions: 
^lq+%^lqp^lp *^jl0q ~ ^^jiequ'^u ^jlSq '^3 
1=1,2,..., L; q=l,2,..., Q and j=l,2,..., J 
That is the marginal return from acquisition of funds type q 
in market 1 is equalized for all intermediaries with positive 
acquisition activities and is equal to the market supply price 
for funds type q in market 1. Similarly, condition (3.4k) 
ensures that the marginal return from acquisition of funds 
type r at source o is equalized for all intermediaries with 
positive acquisition activities and is equal to the imputed 
market price of funds type r at source o: 
^or ~ °jo0r ^^joGru^u ^^jo6r3 '^3 
O—lf2f • # # / Oy R snd j 1^2^###^ J 
Conditions (3.4i and 3.4 ensure that each inter­
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mediary increases alternative uses of funds to the levels 
which equalize the marginal return for the alternative 
uses of funds and which equate them to the marginal cost 
of funds available for allocation and transfer: 
~ "^hn °jhen ^^jhGnu^u |^jh0n3 
j=l,2,..., J; h=l,2,..., H and n=l,2,..., N 
~ ^kT^^iikes ^kjkGs) ~ jk0su"^^kjk0su^^u 
^bjkGsg ^3 
j=l,2,..., J; kf]=l,2,..., J and 
S—1 f 2 f m • m f S 
^jjes " ^ ^jjesu^u %^]j0s3 *^3 
/ » # « / Jf and s®l ^ 2 ^ ^ S 
Similarly conditions (3.4] - 3.4 il) ensure that each 
intermediary increases alternative acquisition of funds 
activities to levels which equalize the marginal cost for 
all alternative sources of funds and which equate them 
to the marginal return from funds available for allocation 
and transfer activities: 
V7 v W r* m W 
~ ^jiQq ^^jiequ^u ^ ji0q3 *^3 
] —1 f  2  f  m  »  »  f  J  /  1" l f 2 / » » » f  Xi Q—' l f 2 f m » m f  Q 
85 
^or ^ ^ jo8r ^^joSru^u ^ ^ ^jo6r3 '^3 
j=l,2,..., J; 0=1,2,..., 0 and r=l,2,..., R 
'l^j - ^ ]^ + (cjkjQg + °kkj0s^ ^ ^ ^^jkj0su ^ 
^kkjSsu^ *^u kj0s3 '^3 
p 
j—1,2,... J, k^j—1,2,..., J and s~*l ,2,..., S 
Taken together conditions (3.4i-3.4^ ensure that 
each intermediary, for all positive acquisition, allocation 
and transfer activities, equates the marginal cost of all 
alternative sources of funds and the marginal return in 
all alternative uses of funds. 
Model Evaluation 
Principal structural aspects 
The model presented in this chapter provides an 
improved capability to reflect the topology of localized 
financial markets. There are two key structural aspects 
of the model: (1) activity analysis formulation of indi­
vidual firm operations, and (2) simultaneous determination 
of pricing and flow of funds patterns in spatially separate 
source and use of funds markets. These elements allow 
significant detail in modeling the financial intermediation 
process in localized markets. At the same time, the model 
has the flexibility for considerable policy analyses of 
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pending legislative proposals and industry initiative by 
determining changes in the acquisition, transfer, allocation 
and pricing outcomes associated with changing industry 
structure, changing degree of market and intermediary inte­
gration and independence, changing competitive environment, 
and changing pricing and flow of funds restrictions. 
The activity analysis formulation for intermediaries 
is a logical extension of asset management models. De­
tailed models of single institutions have been structured, 
evaluated and implemented in an operational environment 
and will provide information directly applicable to the 
model of financial intermediation presented. 
The spatial price and allocation activity analysis 
structure has been successfully demonstrated in other appli­
cations (95). Application to financial intermediation 
in localized markets allows for detailed linkages among 
intermediaries and local source and use of funds markets. 
This aspect of the model should allow useful insights to 
the crucial determinants in flow of funds, utilization 
of financial and nonfinancial resources, as well as pricing 
outcomes associated with flow of funds levels in local 
markets. 
Limitations and extensions 
A number of characteristics of the model represent 
limitations and at the same time offer prospects for enhance-
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ment of the model: (1) limiting assumptions of perfect 
competition; (2) data intensity; and (3) limitations of 
partial equilibrium, single period analysis. 
Assumptions of perfect competition Many aspects 
of the financial intermediation process in localized markets 
are not realistically reflected in the perfect competition 
model as presented. Three assumptions need to be examined 
in greater detail: (1) profit maximizing behavior; (2) 
price equals marginal cost and price equals marginal return 
pricing in use and source of funds markets; and (3) market 
clearing conditions equating supply and demand for funds 
in asset markets. 
Profit maximization, while a good representation 
of the behavior of commercial banks, is less applicable 
to nonbank intermediaries. However, the assumption of 
profit maximization should not prove to be a serious limita­
tion for three reasons. First, initial applications of 
the model are likely to concentrate on the commercial bank­
ing structure which represents the most diversified and 
important part of the United States financial system. Profit 
maximization could be a good proxy for the behavior of 
some nonbank intermediaries. Finally and most important, 
sufficing behavior of individual intermediaries can be 
explicitly modeled by using appropriate policy restrictions. 
The imputed cost of such behavioral restraints directly 
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enter the objective function and pricing conditions. 
The model describes market equilibrium through 
the simultaneous determination of price and flow of funds 
brought about by perfect competition pricing. One of the 
principal issues concerning financial intermediation in 
localized markets is the degree of concentration of inter­
mediaries and their potential for market power. Localized 
financial markets are most accurately characterized by vary­
ing degrees of oligopolistic behavior. Such pricing consid­
erations can be incorporated into the model, chapters 4 and 
5 describe a number of model alternatives to perfect compe­
tition pricing; (1) monopoly pricing; (2) varying degrees 
of competitive pricing between the extremes of perfect 
competition and monopoly; (3) oligopolistic pricing in some 
product lines and perfect competition pricing in others; and 
(4) generalization to include advertising and differentiated 
product demand. 
The validity of market clearing conditions equating 
supply and demand in asset markets must also be questioned. 
Existing price distortions in the financial system, e.g., 
interest rate ceilings, have led to a degree of nonprice 
rationing in financial markets (72). The degree to which 
such activity limits the usefulness of the spatial equilibrium 
model is mitigated by a number of considerations. Credit 
rationing functions mainly involve the activities of inter­
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mediaries and these distortions can be reflected in the 
activity analysis structure of the model. Combined with reliable 
estimates of demand for credit, the model should provide a 
good representation of market activity. Chapter 6 considers 
the problem of obtaining empirical estimates of the demand for 
credit based on data which reflects markets in disequilibrium. 
Harris (72, p. 239) suggests another consideration, 
"As banks make particular changes in loan terms, borrowers 
will react to such changes through the demand functions." 
If such nonprice factors are significant, demand relation­
ships could be extended to include quantifiable factors 
and the model even extended to include endogenous determina­
tion of nonprice factors, e.g., advertising. 
Finally, the model is directed at policy analyses 
of changes to the financial system. Many of the changes 
are aimed at eliminating price restrictions and creating 
greater reliance on market determination of price. 
Data intensity The difficulties in estimating 
market demand and supply for financial instruments are accen­
tuated by the problems in delineating financial markets. 
Mathis, Harris and Boehlje define a financial market, 
...as an area encompassing all of those economic 
units that exert and react essentially to the same 
set of competitive forces influencing the price or 
quality of a specific product or service (121, p. 602) . 
90 
Based on this definition, the authors discuss alternative 
approaches to delineation of rural financial markets and 
offer an approach based on firms response times in price 
adjustments. As with most delineation procedures, the 
reliability of demand and supply estimates will ultimately 
be a function of the accuracy of available financial data. 
The data intensity of the model is not confined 
to the market relationships and represents the greatest 
potential disadvantage of the model. However, sufficient 
data for successful implementation of single firm models 
indicate that data requirements, in terms of technical 
coefficients in the activity analysis structure and in 
terms of cost parameters, can be met. Current interest 
in developing more comprehensive and accurate financial 
data series provides the prospect for improved identifica­
tion and estimation of market relationships (122). Finally, 
as discussed in chapter 5, sensitivity analyses of results 
to changes in model coefficients can aid in identifying 
key data inputs as well as accounting for uncertainty in 
estimates of model parameters. 
Partial equilibrium, single period analyses. Sen­
sitivity analyses can also play an important role in circum­
venting the short run nature of a fixed technology set 
in firm operations. Structural parameters could be varied 
over a range of short run alternatives. Two other important 
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short run features of the model, partial equilibrium and single 
modeling period, can also be mitigated. 
The partial equilibrium nature of the model and implied 
constancy of other sectors of the economy is not as significant 
a limitation in modeling localized financial markets as in 
application to an entire sector or larger subset of the economy. 
It does restrict the amount of detail allowed in modeling 
external linkages between local financial markets and other 
sectors of the economy or hierarchial levels of the financial 
system. However, exogenous factors can be reflected in the 
demand and supply specifications. For example, consider the 
simple demand price relationship e = f(y,F) where F represents 
exogenous factors fixed in the short run and thus "lumped" in­
to the constant term, X, in the linear demand function, e = 
X-wy. Changing exogenous impacts in the short run could be 
accomplished by parameterization of X or elements comprising X. 
Also the activity analysis structure which allows linkages 
between intermediaries and external financial institutions to 
the local market could be varied in the analyses; e.g., 
parameterization of a fixed quantity of available funds. 
Asset management models which have been extended 
to a multiperiod or recursive programming framework have 
provided improved representation of the decision process of 
financial intermediaries—especially risk considerations. 
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Intertemporal spatial price and allocation models have 
been developed and applied to nonfinancial problems (95). 
Extending the model presented in this chapter to a 
recursive programming structure could provide improved 
capabilities in two important areas; (1) balance sheet 
management could explicitly model the "financing" of 
assets by liabilities with similar maturities;^ and (2) 
intertemporal cross linkage between asset and liability 
markets could be modeled. 
In conclusion, combined with the extensions discussed 
in this section, the spatial price and allocation activity 
analysis model should provide a practical, comprehensive 
and flexible framework for modeling financial intermediation 
in localized markets. 
The importance of this balance sheet function in 
strategic planning and policy making in banks is discussed 
by Adolfse and Vervoordeldonk (1). In a single period 
model, the balancing of assets and liabilities with similar 
maturities could be accomplished to some degree through 
policy constraints in the model. 
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CHAPTER IV. EXTENDING THE SPATIAL PRICE AND 
ALLOCATION MODEL OF LOCALIZED FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
Only a few empirical applications of spatial price 
and allocation models have included conditions of imperfect 
competition. These efforts have focused almost exclusively 
on demand markets (95, 138). While perfect competition is 
a reasonable proxy for market behavior in many applications, 
especially those in agriculture, this is most often not 
the case in financial intermediation. 
Many proposed changes to existing restrictions in 
the United States financial system concern the potential 
market power of financial intermediaries in local markets. 
Therefore, a useful model for policy analyses of localized 
financial intermediation requires the capability to reflect 
alternative competitive frameworks. Specific market 
assumptions could be modeled or, when the exact form of obli-
gopolistic or oligopsonistic behavior is difficult to specify, 
the impact of proposed policy changes could be analyzed across 
the spectrum of market behavior from perfect competition to 
collusion. Viewing a policy proposal across varying degrees 
of competition should prove useful in identifying those ele­
ments of the financial system on which assumptions concerning 
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market competition have the greatest impact. 
This chapter summarizes existing methods for reflect­
ing conditions of imperfect competition in spatial price 
and allocation models. Building on existing concepts, 
the perfect competition model presented in chapter 4 is 
extended to allow alternatives to perfect competition in 
both demand (asset) and supply (liability) markets. 
Methods for Modeling Imperfect Competition 
Using the notation introduced in chapter 3, the 
following general quadratic programming problem can be 
specified; 
Maximize 
r n 
X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X Cx 
w 0 0 0 0 0 0 w Cw 
V X/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 V Cv 
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 T Ct 
Y 0 0 0 0 — fî , 0 Y -A 
Z 0 0 0 0 0 z n 
— — — 
-T — 
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Subject to 
0 0 0 
'Y 0 X 0 
0 0 0 0 w 0 
MT 0 0 V < D 
0 0 
^v 
0 0 0 T E 
^x 
0 0 Y P 
Bx ®w ®v 0 0 Z G 
[X W V T Y Z] ' > O (4.1) 
The constraint set in problem (4.1) is simply the 
resource balance, policy/regulatory, and nonnegativity 
constraints specified for the perfect competition model, 
i.e., (3.2a-3.2f) and the relevant portion of (3.3). 
Alternative specifications of the objective function (by 
allowing the parameter X to vary) will be discussed after 
a brief description of the solution to problem (4.1). 
The solution to problem (4.1) is the solution to 
an equivalent saddle value problem (152) , whera 
[A r "i* E E K] ' is a vector of lagrangian multipliers. The 
saddle value problem (4.2) is shown in figure 4.1. 
The necessary conditions for [X W V T Y Z]' and [A F Y s Z K]' 
to be a saddle value solution to problem (4.2) are given by 
À/2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 -n 0 
0 0 0 0 0- 0  
X 
w 
V 
w 
S 
-A 
H 
1» 
K 
-P O 0 0 10 
X y 
o p 0 0 0 -I„ 
w z 
M -M -M o o 
X X V t 
o o Py o o o 
Ax Aw Ay At O 0 
Bx B* By Bt 0 ^ 
" X ' 
w 
V 
T 
Y 
X 
ï r Y 5 Z K ] " > 0  (4.2) 
Figure 4.1. Equation 4.2 
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the Kuhiî-Tucker conditions.^ Using an 
to represent (4.2), L = x* (X/2 Qx-c) 
Tucker conditions are as follows: 
X/2 (Q' + Q) -c -A'p < 0 
b - Ax 2 0 
[X/2 (Q' + Q) -c -A'p] ' X = 0 
(b-Ax) ' p = 0 
Monopoly/monopsony model 
When X=2, problem (4.1) becomes the monopoly/monopsony 
model of localized financial intermediation. The objective 
function is to maximize gross profits, Y(A-OY)-Z'(n+0Z)-
X'C^-W'C^-V'Cv-T'Ct/ subject to resource balance, policy/ 
regulatory, and nonnegativity constraints. When it can 
be assumed that the collective activity of individual units 
is represented by the centralized decision making behavior 
reflected in the objective function, the model gives the 
collusion solution to the oligopoly/oligopsony problem. 
The monopoly/monopsony pricing conditions are re­
flected in the solution to the saddle value problem. With 
the exception of 3.2g, 3.4g, 3.2h, and 3.4h, the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are identical to the constraints, 
^Sufficient conditions are that (Q'+Q) be negative 
semi-definite. For an economic interpretation see (137). 
abbreviated notation 
+ p'(b-Ax), the Kuhn-
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(3.2a-3.2h, 3.2i'-3.2&'), and the optimality conditions, 
(3.4a-3.4£), for the perfect competition model presented 
in chapter 3. Conditions 3.2g, 3.4g, 3.2h and 3.4h are 
replaced by Kuhn-Tucker conditions which reflect monopoly 
pricing in asset markets and monopsony pricing in liability 
markets. Taken with equations 3.4i and 3.4] and positive 
flow of funds activities, they ensure that, in equilibrium, 
marginal return and marginal cost are equated in both asset 
and liability markets. 
^hn ^'^hnm ^hm ^^hmn ^hm — ^hn 
m m 
^hn (^hn ^^hnm ^hm ^'^hmn ^hm ^hn^ ^ 
m m 
h=l,2,..., H and n=l,2, ... N 
^iq - ^iq ^^iqp ^ip %*ipq^ip 
^Iq (Ylq ~ ^Iq ~ %^lqp ^Ip " ^ ^Ipq ^Ip* ~ ° 
1~1,2, •••, Xj and q—1,2, ..., Q 
Maruyama-Fuller model 
Recognizing that in many cases neither the assump­
tions of pure competition nor monopoly assumptions provide 
an adequate simulation of reality, Maruyama and Fuller 
(120) proposed an alternative model which used, "... 
parametric quadratic programming procedures as its basic 
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mathematical technique." The basic concept of the 
Maruyama-Fuller model can be illustrated using the general 
quadratic programming problem (4.1) when 5 and $ are 
symétrie. Problem (4.1) is actually more general than the 
Maruyama-Fuller model which considered imperfect competition 
conditions only in consumer markets (analogous to asset 
markets). 
As described above, when A=2 problem (4.1) becomes 
the monopoly/monopsony model. When A=1 and 0 and are 
symmetric problem (4.1) represents an alternative specifica­
tion of the perfect competition model given in chapter 3. 
The objective function is to maximize net benefits for the 
sector or subsector being modeled, 
Y' (A-l/2i^Y)-Z' (n+l/2$Z)-X'C^-W'C^-V'C^-T'C^, 
subject to resource balance, policy/regulatory, and non-
negativity constraints.^ 
Symmetric U and 0 are necessary for the existence 
of the line integrals of the individual demand and supply 
of funds relationships in the net benefit function: 
I f  (I (^hn" ^^nm^hm^ ^^hn^ "^^^^lg"*'^'''lqp^lp^'^^Iq^ hn m 1 g -a p -ar r -a 
"III °jhen *ih8n " °jl0q "jl8g " °jo8r ^joOr 
~j jjk s ^°iik8s •*" °kjk8s^ ^jk8s " U °jj8s ^jj0s* 
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The Kuhiï-Tucker conditions for the saddle value 
problem associated with problem (4.1), when A=1 and and $ 
are symmetric/ are identical to the constraints, (3.2a-
3.2h, 3.2i'-3.2&'), and optimality conditions, (3.4a-3.4£), 
for the perfect competition model presented in chapter 3. 
Maruyama and Fuller suggested the parameterization 
1 A £ 2, in order to represent varying degrees of competi­
tion (not specifically defined) between extremes of pure 
competition and collusive behavior for the firms being 
modeled. In particular, they suggested the parameteriza­
tion as a means to determine the degree of imperfection in 
markets by comparing model results, for varying values 
of X, with real world results. They effected the parameter­
ization in conjunction with the use of Wolfe's algorithm as 
a solution procedure (135) in an application to the problem 
of interregional production and distribution of milk for 
fluid use or manufacturing use in the northeast and north 
central United States. 
Duloy-Norton model 
Duloy and Norton (51) proposed a nonlinear pro­
gramming formulation as an alternative method for varying 
the degree of competition in spatial price and allocation 
models. The Duloy-Norton concept can be illustrated using 
problem (4.1), with X=1 and;symmetric and $ matrices, 
and adding the following nonlinear constraint: 
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X ' 
/ 
" 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
w 0 0 0 0 0 .0 w Cw 
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 V - Cv 
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 T Ct 
y 0 0 0 0 —n 0 Y -A 
z _ _ 0 0 0 0 0 _ z _ _ n_ 
The nonlinear constraint (4.3) is used to effect the parameter­
ization from perfect competition to a collusion solution. 
As I* is varied from zero or some non binding level (per­
fect competition) to maximum profits (collusion), the solution 
reflects the pricing and flow outcomes under alternative 
comeptitive conditions. In addition, the method provides 
a way to enodgenize monopoly/monopsony profits. The model 
has been applied to a large scale programming model of 
Mexican agriculture and, in an effort to utilize the power 
of the linear programming simplex method, used separable 
programming techniques to approximate the solution to the 
nonlinear problem (64) . Using a simplified scenario, • 
figure 4.2 provides a graphic comparison of the Maruyama-
Fuller and Duloy-Norton approaches. The diagram illustrates 
a single asset market (y) with demand price given by price = 
a-1/2 by, a single binding constraint (competitive case) 
on the amount of y marketed, and a constant marginal cost. 
Maruyama-Fuller effect a series of solutions by parameter­
izing the equilibrium condition, a-X/2 by = explicit marginal 
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cost + imputed marginal cost of the policy constraint, 
between the competitive case y^ and p^ (X=l) and the monopoly 
case y^ and p^ (X=2). Duloy-Norton effect a series of 
solutions by parameterizing a nonlinear constraint on profits 
between the competitive case and the monopoly case. The 
nonlinear constraint is illustrated by varying the area 
representing profits from zero pure profit MC-P^-B-A (this 
area is the imputed cost of the policy constraint) to 
monopoly profits MC-P^^F-E. 
Self-dual models 
Both the Maruyama-Fuller and Duloy-Norton formula­
tions are restricted by assuming symmetric ÎÎ and $ matrices 
as a logical means of specifying an objective function. 
Plessner (138) has shown that self-dual programming struc­
tures, which would not require symétrie 0 and $, exist 
which "imitate" imperfectly competitive structures. The 
models which were developed, represented a leading firm 
competitive structure and a structure in which some products 
were marketed under monopoly conditions and others under 
perfect competition conditions. The models considered 
only a single consumption region and were applied to the 
apple and pear industry in Israel. 
The self-dual characteristics of the model are 
achieved by modifying the self-dual quadratic programming 
model for perfect competition by (1) including the negative 
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Price 
Maruyama-Fuller; 
Binding policy 
constraint X/2 by 
Duloy-Norton: 
{I=MC-P -D-C 
Mc-P -B-A<I<MC-P_-F-E} 
MC 
MC (marginal cost) 
price= 
a-1/2 by 
varying 
competition= 
a-X/2 by marginal 
revenue= a-by 
asset y, y y, V c 
Figure 4.2. Comparison of Maruyama-Fuller 
and Duloy-Norton approaches 
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of monopoly profits in the "net profit" objective function, 
and (2) replacing perfect competition pricing conditions 
in the constraint set with imperfectly competitive pricing 
conditions for appropriate markets and products. This 
basic concept can be used to extend the perfect competition 
spatial price and allocation activity analysis model of 
localized financial intermediation to allow alternative 
competitive environments in both demand (asset) and supply 
(liability) markets. 
An Imperfect Competition Model for 
Localized Financial Markets 
The flexibility to model perfect competition in 
some markets,while considering imperfect conditions in 
others, is especially appealing for applications to problems 
of local financial markets where intermediaries often exhibit 
market power in some markets and not in others. 
Asset markets 
Consider the case where intermediaries allocate 
funds to some asset markets reflecting monopoly pricing 
conditions. Let the first assets be acquired in markets 
h=l,2, h^, reflecting monopoly pricing with the remaining 
assets acquired in markets reflecting perfect competition 
pricing. The perfect competition model from chapter 3 
can be modified to include monopoly pricing for the appro­
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priate markets and assets. For those asset markets which 
exhibit monopoly behavior, equations (3.2g) can be replaced 
by the following pricing conditions; 
ni 
^hn l''hnm ^hm ^,'*^hmn ^hm — ^hn 
m mal 
h=l,2, ...h^ and n=l,2, ..n^ (4.4) 
The self-dual characteristics of the model are 
maintained by adding the negative of monopoly profits to 
the objective function; 
' h nil mL 
The monopoly pricing conditions, marginal revenue £ marginal 
cost, can be seen by comparing conditions (4.4) and the 
corresponding equations from (3.2i'): 
hn ~ ^ '^hnm ^hm ~ ^hmn ^hn 
m m—1 
— ^hn — ^ jh0n ^ * ^ ^jh6nu°u ^ ^ ^jh0n3 '^3 
h=l,2, ..., H and n=l,2, ..., N 
It can also be shown that, at the optimum, the 
negative of monopoly profits is given by (4.5). If the 
optimum solution results in positive allocation of funds 
to a monopoly asset market, then y^^ > 0 and some > 0 
and marginal revenue equals marginal cost: 
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ni 
^hn ^^hnm ^hm ^^^^hitin ^hm ^hn (4.6) 
^hn *^jh0n ^ ^ ^ ^jhSnu^u "*" ^^jhSng (4.7) 
Multiplying (4.6) and (4.7) by and summing over all 
intermediaries gives the following equations; 
6hn I*]h8n I^*jh8n*^ih8n^^i*^^ih8nu^u* ^ jhSng^g^j 
(4.8) 
and 
"l 
(^hn ^ ^hnm^hm ^^^^hmn^hm^I^jhGn ^hnl^jhSn (4.9) 
Also, from (3.4a), with 6^^ > 0 at the optimal: 
^hn = %*ih8n 
Combining equations (4.8) and (4.9), substituting (4.10) 
and rearranging terms gives the following equation for 
monopoly profits in the asset market; 
^hn^^hn ^'^hmn^hm^ I*ih8n(^jh8n^^i^^^jh8nu^u 
^^^ih8ng^&) " ^ hn ^ ^^^hmn ^hm 
The first term on the left hand side of equation (4.11) 
is the total revenue from allocating funds to asset n in 
market h; the second term is minus total implicit and explicit 
costs to the intermediaries for allocating funds to asset 
n in market h. Summing over appropriate asset/market com­
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binations, total monopoly profits are as follows: 
hi ni ni hi nj. 
hll nil ^hm' ^ J/hmn ^hn 
Liability markets 
Monopsony pricing in liability markets can be handled 
in a fashion similar to monopoly pricing in asset markets. 
Consider monopsony pricing for liabilities q=l,2, ...q^ 
in markets 1=1,2, ...1^. Monopsony conditions are reflected 
by first modifying equations (3.2h) for monopsony markets: 
^iq - ^iq I'^iqp ^ip pli ^ipq ^iq 
1=1,2 ... 1^ and q=l,2, ...q^ 
(4.12) 
Also, the negative of monopsony profits are added to the 
objective function, thus,maintaining the self-dual charac­
teristics of the model: 
- il gK 'iq 
Monopsony pricing conditions can be seen by comparing 
(4.12) and the appropriate equations from (3.2]'): 
^i"°jl9q~%^jl8qu°ur^bjl8qgKg 1 ^Iq - "'iq + 
qi 
^*iqp ^ip * pli^ipq ^iq 
1=1,2, ..., L and q=l,2, ..., Q 
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It also follows that (4.13) represents the negative 
of monopsony profits at the optimal. For positive pricing 
and flow quantities, > 0 and > 0 with some ^ jieg > 0' 
the following conditions hold at the optimal: 
91 
- 'iq + % •iqp 'IP ^ pEl 
° " °jieq " \ ®jl0qu °u " % "^jieqê '^8 
"iq = I "jieq 
Multiplying (4.14) and (4.15) by wy^gg and summing 
across all intermediaries gives the following equations; 
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^Iq I*]16q ~ ^^Iq'^'^^lqp^lp ^^jl9q 
(4.17) 
^iq ['1'j-'="ieq-^^jl6qu%-|'=jieqs^s"'jl6q] 
(4.18) 
Combining equations (4.17) and (4.18), substituting (4.16) 
and rearranging terms gives the following equation for 
monopsony profits for the liability market being considered; 
l"fj "jieq - I ICjlSq + ^ ^jlequ % + ^ "^jieqS 
V -
^Iq '"iq + I •iqp^lp' " ^Ip pi/ Ipq ^IP (4.19) 
The first term on the left hand side of equation (4.19) is 
the total return from funds acquired by liability q in 
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market 1; the second term is minus total implicit and ex­
plicit costs of the acquisition activities; and the third 
term is minus the cost of funds in the liability market. 
Summing over appropriate liability/market combinations, 
total monopsony profits are as follows: 
91 ll ^2 
1=1 ^qil ^19 'p=l 1=1 9=1 P=1 
Varying degrees of competition 
The concept introduced by Maruyama and Fuller for 
varying the degree of competition in markets can be intro-
ducted into the imperfect competition model for localized 
financial intermediation. The following general pricing 
conditions replace equations (3.2g) and 3.2h) in the perfect 
competition model where a and n replace the parameter 
^hn ~ ^ ^hnm ^hm '^hn ^ '^hm ^hmn ^hm — ^hn 
m m 
(4.20) 
h=l,2, .../ H and n=l,2, ..., N 
^Iq ^  ^Iq I *lqp "^Ip "^Iq ^ '^Ip *lpq =lp 
1=1,2, L and q=l,2, ..., Q (4.21) 
As discussed above, when a^^=0 funds are allocated to 
asset n in market h where pricing reflects conditions of 
pure competition. When a^=l, pricing reflects monopolistic 
conditions. Parameterization of 0 £ < 1, could 
110 
be used to imitate the range of competition between the 
two extremes. Similarly, the parameterization of n^q/ 
0 _< n^q < 1/ could be used to imitate varying degrees of 
competition in liability markets from perfect competition 
to monopsony. 
The self-dual nature of the model is maintained 
by adding the negative of monopoly and monopsony returns 
to the objective function; 
% ^ ^ ^hn ^'hm ^hmn ^hm ^ hn h n m 
"Il ^^Iq ^Ip ^Ipq ^Ip ^Iq 
1 p q 
The self-dual characteristics of the model 
be more easily seen from the matrix notation; 
Maximize (3.1') + (4.22) + (4.23) 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
can 
is an (HN)x(HN) diagonal matrix whose diagonal 
e lements are ^12' ••• ^21' •••' ^ hn ' ' * * * f * 
n is a (LQ) (LQ) diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements 
are *^12' '**' ^ ' ^21' •**' '^Iq' •**' '^lq' 
Ill 
x 
/ 
"o 0 0 0 0 -M' 
X 
0 0 0 ' • x l  CX 
w  0  0  0  0  0  -•p; M' 
w 
0  0  0  w  CW 
V  0  0  0  0  0  0  M' 
V -A; 0  0  V  
T 0  0  0  0  0  0  
-Mj. 0  
-^ t  
0  0  T 
A 
-P 
X 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  A 0  
r 0  PW 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  -I 
z 
r - 0  
Y M 
X 
•M 
X Mt 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  Y D 
5 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  M E 
Z \ 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  z F 
K B 
X 
0  0  0  0  . 0  0  0  0  K G 
Y 0  0  0  0  
-V 
0  0  0  0  0  -(n+a''f2''a) 0 Y -A 
Z 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , Z . n 
Subject to (3.2a-3.2f, 4.20, 4.21), (3.2i'-3.22'), (3.3)^ (3.3') 
" 0 0 0 0 0 -M' 0 
-^x -®x 0 0 *x' 
" G ,  
0 0 0 0 0 
-^w % 0 -^w 0 0 w Cw 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
-®v 0 0 V 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -M' t 0 'K  -®t 0 0 T Ct 
-^x 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
'y 0 A 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-^z 
r < 0 
^x-•V Mt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 
D 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s E 
^x \ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 F 
®x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 K G 
0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 -(fl+a'fl''a) 0 y -A 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 z. n 
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[ X  W  V  T  A r Y  5  z  K  Y  Z  ] ' < 0  
Model evaluation 
The model presented in this chapter presents a 
convenient structure for modeling perfect competition in 
some asset and liability markets and collusion solutions 
in others. In addition, parameterization of the values 
of a and n can be used to "imitate" imperfect competition 
conditions other than the collision solution to the monopoly/ 
monopsony problem. While the parameterization of a and n 
does not allow specific definition of the degree of 
imperfection, the self-dual concept can be used to model 
specific oligopolistic or oligopsonistic behavior. A series 
of prototype models are presented in chapter 5 which illus­
trate how the model can be extended to consider additional 
elements of imperfect competition, including differentiated 
product demand and market shares solution to the oligopoly 
problem. 
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CHAPTER V. SPATIAL PRICE AND ALLOCATION MODELS 
FOR COMMERCIAL BANKING MARKETS: SOME PROTOTYPES 
A number of prototypes for commercial banking are 
described in this chapter. The prototypes have been designed 
(1) to demonstrate that the basic model structure described 
in chapters 3 and 4 can accommodate the most common con­
straints encountered in programming models of individual 
commercial banks,^ and (2) to illustrate that the basic 
model structure is flexible enough to allow extensions which 
model specific characteristics of imperfect competition which 
may be known or assumed to exist in local financial markets. 
Finally, extensions to the model to include multiperiod 
programming and separable programming are discussed. 
A Prototype for Commercial Banking Markets 
The basic prototype, described below, models two 
separate market areas. The first market area reflects a 
simple scenario showing the interactions in a competitive 
multibank market. This portion of the prototype will be 
modified in subsequent sections in order (1) to reflect 
^Models of individual banks provide examples of 
constraint structure as well as sources of coefficient values. 
Also see (19, 20, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102). 
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banks facing a differentiated product demand in the use of 
funds market, (2) to include advertising variables, and 
(3) to show examples of specific types of imperfect compe­
tition including the leading firm, monopolistic competition 
and market share solutions. The second market area reflects 
the activities of a single commercial bank in more detail. 
The constraint structure includes most of the major types 
of constraints encountered in models of individual commer­
cial banks. 
Initially, the market areas are not linked so that 
the prototype can be separated and illustrated in two dis­
tinct parts. However, transfer activities could easily 
be introduced to represent correspondent relationships, 
loan participation agreements, branch affiliation and 
other activities which describe greater bank and market 
interaction. An example of a correspondent relationship 
between a bank in the multibank market and the bank in the 
single bank market illustrates how such linkages can be 
modeled. The basic notation described in chapters 3 and 4 
will be followed as closely as possible; however, specific 
parameters will be described in more detail as necessary. 
Multibank market 
Market one, h=l=o=l, is assumed to be a multi-
bank market with two intermediaries, j=l,2, competing in 
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a single use of funds market, and a single source of 
funds market, No additional sources or uses of funds, 
nonfunds resource constraints nor policy and regulatory con­
straints are considered. The parts of the objective func­
tion and constraint set associated with market one follow; 
MAXIMIZE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION = 
{ ^111 Yii  ^ll^^ll"^"ll 4^11 ^11 
) - ^111^11 " ^ 11 ^111 ^11^ 
Subject to 
2 
^11 - jii *ii8i 
2 
- ^11 
Xjiei - *ji8i for j=l,2 
X 11 ~ '"ill ^11 " °^11 ^111 Yll 
< 6 
11 
•^11 - "^11 ^ *111 ^11 ^11 *111 ^11 
for j=l,2 
l^jlQl + ^ 11 for j=l,2 
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(^liei' *2191' *1191' *2191' ^11' ^ 11' ^ 1' ^ 2' 
Yll' =11) > 0 
The self dual characteristics of this portion of the proto­
type can be seen in figure 5.1. 
Single bank market 
Market two, h=l=o=2, contains a single commercial 
bank, j=3. The bank's source and use of funds activities 
are described in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Sources and uses of funds 
Acquisition/ Market 
Allocation Demand/ 
Activities Supply Description 
X32el ^21 loans 
X2202 722 existing loans (held) 
X32Q3 723 short-term government securities 
X3294 724 long-term government securities 
W3201 Z21 time deposits 
V32Q1 622 borrowing from Federal Reserve (1) 
V.32Q2 ^22 borrowing from Federal Reserve (2) 
V32Q3 €23 government demand deposits 
V32Q4 624 existing loans (marketed) 
^3381 ~ cash 
A C T I V I T I E S  
O F  
F-H 
Œ >  I-H 
I-H 
C D  
T—1 
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X 
r-f C D  TH 
W  
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r 4  TH 
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1-4 1-4 r 4  
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e -
1-4 1-4 
X  
1-4 RH 
N  
- qiiadratic 
-Cl+aii) -(I+Hii) 
- linear w  
"^1101 
X 
"2101 
W 
"^1101 "^2101 0 0 0 0 \l "^11 
constraint 
set 
1 -1 
- ^1101 
1 -1 < c* 
- ^2101 
-1 1 
- ^1161 
-1 1 
- 4l01 
-1 -1 1 < 0 
1 1 -1 < 0 
1 -1 < 0 
1 -1 < 0 
-1 
-Cl+aii) 
• - -^11 
1 
-Ci+n^p ^111 1^1 
Figure 5.1. Prototype - Multibank market 
118 
The bank acts as a monopolist in the market for 
new loans and as a monopsonist in the market for time 
deposits. The demand price for new loans and the supply 
price for time deposit equations are respectively 
^21 " ^211 ^21 ^21 ^211 221' Alternative uses of 
funds—existing loans (held), short-, and long-term govern­
ment securities—are assumed to provide fixed returns 
given respectively by Agg' ^23 ^24* 
Commercial banks often have access to funds with a limited 
availability at a fixed cost and additional funds available 
only at an increased cost. To illustrate modeling such 
a limitation, e^^ is assumed to be the maximum borrowing 
from the Federal Reserve discount window at an initial 
rate. Funds acquired at a higher rate cannot exceed 622' 
assumed to be a management set limit on total Federal Reserve 
borrowing minus 621* With ^ 2Q2 ^  ^3201' ^3201"' ^3202 
treated identically in the constraint set, V22Q2 will not 
enter the optimal solution unless the limit ^ 2X been 
reached. The market limit on the supply of government 
demand deposits is given as egg. The sale of existing 
assets in primary or secondary markets can provide a source 
of funds. This concept is illustrated by the marketing 
of existing loans; the market limit on the resale of loans 
is given as ©24' ^  percent of total loans existing at 
the beginning of the period. 
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The resource balance and balance sheet constraints 
are as follows; 
rzn - *328n ° for n=l,2,3,4 
"3261 ^21 < 0 
^32er " ®2r - ° for r=l,2,3,4 
4 4 
*326n ^3391 " *3281 ~ ^328r - ° 
n=l r=l 
Models of individual commercial banks often include 
limits on the use of labor, capital equipment, capacity 
and other.nonfunds resources (142). For example, the fol­
lowing constraint limits labor units available to manage 
government securities, f^: 
4 
^^3 ^320nl^320n - ^1 
The coefficients a32831 ^32041 indicate labor pro­
ductivity in managing government securities, i.e., labor 
units used per dollar of government securities held. Let 
^32031 ^  ^  ^32041 ~ 
In addition to nonfunds resource constraints, 
commercial bank models will include policy and regulatory 
constraints which generally are restrictions required 
by law, imposed or suggested by government regulatory 
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agencies, or imposed by bank management.^ Regulatory re­
strictions include collateral or pledging constraints 
as well as legal reserve requirements. Commercial banks 
may be required to hold certain assets portions of which 
may serve as collateral for acquiring certain liabilities. 
For example, the following collateral constraint reflects 
a pledging requirement—for borrowing from the Federal 
Reserve discount window and for government demand deposits— 
which is met by government securities and partially met 
by loans; 
4 3 
~ 328nl *328n '^320ri ^328r - ° 
n—X 3-—X 
Where, bggQgi = ^32041 ^  ^ 32911 ^32921 ^ ^ 32031 ^  
and bgggii = ^32021 = ^ legal reserve requirement on 
time deposits and government demand deposits can also 
be shown: 
^32012 ^ 3201 ^32032 ^3203 " ^ 33012 ^3301 - ° 
Where, b^ggi^ the required reserve on time deposits 
and the required reserve on government demand deposits 
is ^ 22032 = .175; b329i2 = 1- Federal Reserve examiners' 
^See (9, 32, 39, 40, 47, 52, 58, 61, 81, 142, 175). 
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guidelines for balanced risk-portfolio composition could 
also be reflected in similar linear constraints (9, 32). 
Unlike regulatory constraints which apply to all 
financial intermediaries in a given class, policy constraints 
reflect the unique characteristics of individual bank 
management. Management behavior can be approximated by 
restricting acquisition and allocation activities to conform 
to criteria which bank managers feel are accepted indicators 
of sound bank management in balancing risk, growth and 
profitability. Portfolio composition constraints can 
be used to reflect management judgements of maximum or 
minimum acceptable levels of certain assets and liabilities. 
Constraints could also restrict the ratio of one group 
of financial instruments to another, e.g., loan to deposit 
ratio. Such constraints are commonly used to match liquidity 
and maturity characteristics of sources of funds with 
asset purchases for which the funds are used. The following 
example of a portfolio composition, constraint limits 
the ratio of government securities to total assets: 
^320n3 *328n ^^613 ^ 3301 - ° 
n=l 
Let b^2ei3 = "32623 = "33613 = =' 
accepted ratio of government securities to total assets 
and where b^2033 = ^32043 = ^ -1. 
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Besides limits on absolute values or ratios of 
financial instruments, limits on activities may take other 
forms such as maturity and liquidity constraints. Fielitz 
and Loeffler (58) suggest the use of maturity constraints 
as one means to represent management's subjective evaluation 
of future economic conditions. For example, the following 
constraints establish an upper, g^, and lower, g^, limit 
on the average maturity of government securities; 
4 
ia L ^32en4 *326n - "^4 
4 
^320n5 *328n -
n—o 
where the maturity coefficient for short-term government 
securities is given as ^ >22934 = ^32635 ~ and the maturity 
coefficient for long-term government securities by ^>32944 ~ 
^32645 ~ ^ liquidity constraint, requiring liquid 
assets to be held in excess of reserve requirements for 
time and demand deposits and to cover Federal Reserve borrow­
ing, can be written as follows: 
4 ^ ^ 
"n^3 ^320n6 *326n " ^33016 ^3301 ^32016 *3261 
^320r6 ^320r - ° 
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Where, bggQsg ^32646 ~ ^ 33616 ^32016 ^32026 
^32016 ~ '23' the reserve requirement plus liquidity buffer 
on time deposits; and ^32026 ~ 1.175, the reserve require­
ment plus liquidity buffer on government demand deposits. 
Policy constraints can also be included simply for 
accounting purposes in the model. The following constraint 
reflects the balancing condition for loans existing at the 
beginning of the modeling period; 
^32027 *3282 ^32047 ^ 3264 - ^7 
Where ^^2^21 ~ ^ 32847 ~ ^ ^1 ~ loans at the be­
ginning of the period. 
Finally, pricing conditions are as follows (previously 
defined values for coefficients have been substituted where 
appropriate); 
-20)211 y2i " "^21 - ~ ^21 
"^22 - "^22 
^23 - " ^ 23 
" *24' - ~ ^24 
^21 " 2*211 ^21 - ^21 
^21 - *^3201 + ^3 "8^1 + CK3 
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'22 - ^3282 + ^3 * ^*^1 ^'^3 *7 
^23 - °3203 * ^ 3 * ^^1 + (C-1) Kg + 
D<4 - - <6 
*24 - °3204 + *3 + BOi - + (C-1) + EK^ - ËKg - Kg 
^3 - °3201 ^21 '^2 •23Kg 
^3'  - *^3201 ^21 * ^ 1 * ^ 6 
^3' - °3202 ^22 * ^ 1 * ^ 6 
^3 - °3203 ^23 * + «175 Kg + 1.175 Kg 
^3 - °3204 ^24 *^7 
° - *^3361 ^2 + (^"^3 •'' ^3 
The model structure for this portion of the prototype 
is illustrated in figure 5.2. 
Market linkages 
Models of individual intermediaries generally treat 
linkages with other financial institutions as exogenous. 
However, the model structure described in chapters 3 and 4 
provides greater flexibility to explicitly model inter­
actions among financial institutions. Most importantly, 
the impact of activities describing bank and market 
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interaction, (e.g., correspondent relationships, loan par­
ticipation agreements, branch affiliation), on endogenously 
determined pricing and flow quantities can be examined. The 
following example illustrates how such linkages can be 
modeled. 
Bank one in the multibank market is assumed to 
maintain a specified correspondent balance, with 
bank three in the single bank market. In return, bank 
three provides certain services to bank one, including bor­
rowing privileges, t^^gg. These considerations can be in­
cluded in the prototype by modifying the balance sheet 
conditions for both bank one and bank three to account for 
the transfer activities and by introducing new activities 
and constraints to reflect limits and pricing conditions on 
the transfer activities. The modified balance sheet condi­
tions are as follows: 
*1191 ~ *1161 •*" ^13G5 ~ ^3106 1 ° 
4 4 
*328n "*• ^3301 ~ *3291 ~ ^328r ^3196 ~ "*^1395 - ° 
I I—X J-—J.  
The required correspondent balance can be written in terms 
of two inequality constraints, where gg=gg is the specified 
balance: 
^1395 - and ~ "^9 
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The limit on borrowing is 
^3166 ^  9lO 
Finally, the pricing conditions associated with transfer 
activities, ^3106' given: 
"^1 " *8 ^ *9 * ^ 3 — ^ 
*1 - KlO - *3 - G 
where, F = and G = c^^^iee ^33106 
are the explicit net unit costs associated with the transfer 
activities. 
Particularly in branch and holding company affilia­
tions, bank three may provide nonfunds resources. Assume 
that activity by bank one uses the same specialized 
labor as activities X32Q3 ^3204 bank three and at 
the same rate as The capacity constraint on available 
labor units can be modified: 
AX3263 ®^3204 ^^1101 - ^1 
The pricing constraint associated with x^^g^ must also be 
modified to include the implicit cost of the constraint on 
labor: 
6ii ^°l - ^1101 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates these market linkages. Only the 
relevant parts of the prototype shown in figures 5.1 
and 5.2 are shown. The dotted lines signify modified 
constraints (only new coefficients are shown). More com­
plex interactions can be modeled in a similar fashion 
(97, 98, 99). 
Prototypes for Product Differentiation 
The spatial price and allocation activity analysis 
model has been used to demonstrate the perfect competition, 
monopoly, and varying oligopoly solutions in financial 
markets when intermediaries are assumed to provide homo­
geneous products. Commercial banks, as well as other 
financial intermediaries, are often considered to face 
a distinct demand curve for their products (148). That 
is, individual bank's demand price can be given as a function 
not only of the quantity of its own product but also the 
quantity of similar products marketed by competitors. 
Market one of the prototype, presented in the previous 
section, can be modified to illustrate how the basic struc­
ture of the spatial price and allocation model can be 
used to reflect product differentiation.^ 
^Data sources and examples of coefficients for con­
straints introduced in the prototype thus far are readily 
available in the literature cited on models of endurdual 
financial institutions. The coefficients in the constraints 
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Figure 5.3. Prototype—Market linkages 
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The approach is to simply treat each firm's alloca­
tion activity as contributing to a unique product market. 
Assume that the intermediaries, j=l,2, in market one face 
distinct demand curves in the use of funds market. The 
demand for funds at intermediary, j=l, is given as y^^ 
and the demand at intermediary, j=2, is given by y^g-
The demand price functions are as follows: 
^11 " ^111 ^ 11 " "ll2 ^ 12 {5.1a) 
^12 ~ ^121 ^ 11 " ^ ^22 ^ 12 (5.1b) 
The objective function and constraint set can be modified 
as follows: 
Maximize: Objective Function = 
2 2 
" m=l ^In " ^ ^11 *111 ^11^ ^ 11 
2 2^ 2 
" jli (CjlGn *il8n) ' °jl91 ^ jl01 
2 2 
' nil mil ^1° " "ll *111 
(5.2) 
in this section are not readily available. Instead, coeffi­
cient estimates are part of the major task of estimating 
appropriate market source and use of funds functions for 
any specific model application. 
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Subject to 
^11 - *1101 (5.3a) 
^12 - *2182 (5.3b) 
2 
- ^11 (5.3c) 
*1101-^1161 (5.3d) 
*2102-^2161 (5.3e) 
Hi - "llm yim - «11 «im "irai i «11 
2 2 (5.35) 
^2 - "121 ïlm - "12 "im '»U,2 ^Im ^  «12 
(5.3g) 
*^11 - *^1161 *^1 (5.3h) 
^12 - ^2161 ^2 (5.3i) 
'l' - °liei "^11 
'2' - ^2161 •*• ^11 
^11 - "^11 ^111 ^11 •*" ^11 ^111 ^11 (5.35,) 
(^11' ^ 12' ^11' *1161' *2102' ^ 1161' ^ 2101' 
•^12' ^12' Yii' 2 0 (5.4) 
*1^1'— "^IJfll ^11 (5.3j) 
^9 ^  Y -I -| (5.3k) 
133 
Advertising 
Producers of a differentiated product coitiïtionly face 
demand that is a function of firm unique variables such 
as advertising. The following prototypes include adver­
tising. The intermediaries now face not only the choice 
of optimal allocation and acquisition activities but also 
advertising levels. Optimal price, quantity and advertis­
ing levels are endogenously determined in the model. 
The intermediaries' demand price functions can 
be modified to include advertising levels. Where 
is advertising by intermediary, j=l, and A^^^ is advertising 
by intermediary, j=2; the q's are coefficients in the 
linear demand price functions: 
All " ^ 111 ?!! '*^112 ^12 Sill ^11 9ll2 ^ 12 (5.1a') 
^12 " ^ 121 ^ 11 ~ ^122 ^ 12 "*• *^121 ^11 *^122 ^12 (5.1b') 
The objective function can be modified to include advertis-
A A ing. Where c^^ and c^2 represent the unit costs of A^^ 
and A^2 respectively; 
134 
Maximize: Objective Function = 
2 2 
^n=l/^l*"m=l ^lm"^lnm^lm^ ^ ^ln~ (^ll+^lll^ll) ^11 
2 2 2 
"jll *il8n)-j%i(Cjl81 Wjiei+Cij &!]) 
2 2 2 2 
^n^ln^lm^lmnyim^^.n I, ^In^lm^lmn^in^lm 
n=l m=l n=l m=l 
~^11 ^111 ^11^ (5-2') 
Resource constraints on advertising must also be included 
in the model. While there are several ways of doing so, 
the simplest constraints are limits on the absolute levels 
of advertising, (MAX^j), available to the intermediary: 
< MAX^^ (5.3m) 
Aj^2 < MAX^g (5.3n) 
The pricing conditions (5.3f - 5.3g) are modified as 
follows: 
2 2 
^11 " ^'^llm^lm-^llm^lm^ " °^11 '^Im'^lml^lm - *^11 <5.3f') 
In—X lu—X 
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2 2 
^12 " ^'*^12m^lm~'3l2m^m^ " °'l2 ^lm^lm2^1m - ^12 
m=l ra=l 
Finally the conditions, ensuring that the marginal 
return from advertising is less than or equal to the marginal 
cost of advertising, are included in the pricing conditions: 
? A 
^11 °^lm ^im - ^11 *^11 lu—X 
V A 
"l2 \ °'lm *^lm2 ^Im - ^12 °12 
lu—X 
Collusion and leading firm solutions 
As with the case of a homogeneous product, 
and a^2 could be varied to represent varying degrees of 
imperfect competition in the case of a differentiated 
product. Specifically the collusion solution is given 
when ~ 
The theory of partial monopoly can also be shown. 
The leading firm selects its funds activity and advertising 
levels in the same manner as a pure monopolist, while the 
remaining firms adjust funds activities and advertising 
in the same manner as perfect competitors (75). For 
example, let intermediary, j=l, be the leading firm and 
intermediary, j=2, act as a perfect competitor. The lead­
ing firm solution is given by = 1 and a^2 ~ 0 « 
(5.So) 
(5.3p) 
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Monopolistic competition 
The spatial price and allocation model can be 
modified to reflect yet another specific type of irtperfect 
competition, monopolistic competition. Monopolistic com­
petition is assumed to exist in commercial banking 
markets when the number of intermediaries is'suffi­
ciently large so the actions of a single intermediary 
do not affect perceptibly the actions of competitors. 
However, each intermediary is assumed to face a distinct 
demand curve for its product- Monopolistic compe­
tition can be represented by substituting for 
and for in the model. For h, n, m referring to 
markets with product differentiation, the following values 
for and are used to represent the short run equi­
librium for monopolistic competition; 
m n f 1 if n=m 
"hn ' "hm = \ ° 
Market-share solution 
An intermediary may desire to maintain at least 
a certain share of the market for its differentiated product 
regardless of the competitive scenario or impact on short 
run profits. As described in previous sections, such 
sufficing behavior can be represented by including 
constraint in the model: 
sxiiei + <s-i) xziez - ° 
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Where intermediary, j=2, desires to maintain at least 
s share of the market. The pricing conditions (5.3h -
5.3i) are modified and the nonnegativity constraint on 
the imputed unit cost of the market share constraint is 
added as follows; 
6,, < c X +  +  S K .  
'11 - "1181 • ^1 ""1 
- °2lel + *2 + (s-l' "l 
«1 > 0 
(5.3h') 
(5.3i') 
(5.4') 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the prototype for product differen­
tiation including advertising variables and the market-
share constraint. The quadratic portion of the objective 
function is given as follows; 
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F - - 0^2^121) ' ^  
2 2 
^ ~ ~ ("^22 •*• (^12) '^122^' I 
Multiperiod Programming 
The concepts presented so far concerning the appli­
cation of the spatial price and allocation activity analysis 
model to local financial intermediation can be extended to 
the problem of optimal pricing and acquisition/allocation 
over time. Pfaffenberger and Walker (135) describe two 
basic programming approaches for optimal decision making 
over time: (1) recursive programming and (2) dynamic pro­
gramming. For recursive programming, the solution to an 
N time period problem requires the solution to N sequential 
models of the type presented so far. That is, the optimal 
decision vector at time n is a function of current data, 
given the decisions of time period n-1. The principle 
of optimality on which dynamic programming is based is not 
required for recursive programming (65). 
The dynamic programming framework would require 
that the pricing and activity decisions at each time period 
be mutually optimal with the decisions of all other time 
periods. The explicit introduction of time into the quad­
ratic programming framework of spatial price and alloca­
tion activity analysis models is discussed in detail by 
- ("^21 ' 
= - («111("11» >• 
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Takayama and Judge (156). Introducing time into models of 
localized financial intermediation can be thought of simply 
as subscripting all the variables, parameters and constraints 
of the model with a time dimension. In general, the model 
would require the maximization of the present value of 
net revenue for the sector being modeled subject to resource 
balance, pricing conditions, and policy and regulatory con­
straints in all time periods—where discount factors have 
been appropriately introduced to the model,. 
Separable Programming 
As operational models of financial intermediation 
are developed, the size of the problems—given existing 
quadratic programming computer algorithms—may become a 
limitation of the methodology. However, recent computer 
advances^ and the potential application of separable pro­
gramming suggest that the size of most problems would not 
be debilitating to the methodology. Separable programming 
is an application of linear programming to nonlinear 
programming problems in which the nonlinear functions are 
approximated by linear segments (7, 13, 50, 65, 177). Many 
1 In addition to computer hardware advances, Russian 
mathematician, L.G. Khachian, has reported a polynomial time 
algorithm applicable to linear programming. Theoretically 
the algorithm could result in significant computer efficiency 
compared to the commonly used Simplex method which is an ex­
ponential time algorithm. Additionally, the Khachian method 
does not require linear functions (103). 
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linear programming software packages include a separable 
programming option—for example, International Business 
Machines' MPSX (82). 
The reformulation of spatial price and allocation 
activity analysis models of local financial intermediation 
in a separable programming framework could have two prin­
cipal advantages: (1) improved capability for sensitivity 
analysis of model parameters—due to access to linear 
programming algorithms, and (2) improved modeling capa­
bilities by allowing nonlinear constraints. Nonlinear 
constraints could provide an improved capability to model 
risk and uncertainty as well as policy limitations in­
volving net revenue, e.g., tax considerations. 
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CHAPTER VI. LOAN DEMAND AND DEPOSIT SUPPLY AT 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN IOWA: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
As with most models of complex systems, the formu­
lation of operational spatial price and allocation activity 
analysis models of localized financial intermediation will 
require substantial amounts of data. The activity analysis 
structure of the model allows for the transfer of experi­
ences gained in designing and implementing models of 
individual financial intermediaries as well as the transfer 
of actual data used to support those models. However, 
empirical estimates of market relationships representing 
the supply and demand of funds by the nonfinancial units 
in the economy are not readily available for local finan­
cial markets. 
The basic premise of the spatial price and alloca­
tion activity analysis model of localized financial 
intermediation is the simultaneous endogenous determination 
of asset and liability quantities and prices, across 
intermediary types. Logically these same simultaneities 
should be accounted for when setting hypotheses for 
estimating market relationships to be used as inputs to 
the models. 
143 
Only limited work has been reported on estimating 
the demand for assets (22, 59, 133, 153) and liabilities 
{22, 59, 76, 115, 153) by the nonfinancial units in the 
farm sector. Most do not take into account empirically 
(1) the simultaneous determination of the quantity of 
alternative financial assets and liabilities, (2) the 
simultaneous determination of acquisition and allocation 
activities of alternative financial institutions—e.g., 
commercial banks, production credit associations, or even 
(3) the simultaneous determination of price and quantity 
in equating supply and demand for a given financial instru­
ment. Penson (133) provides a theoretical model that 
explicitly treats or is flexible enough to incorporate all 
of these simultaneities. On the basis of portfolio balance 
theory, he specifies three categories of simultaneous 
relationships for nonfinancial units in the agricultural 
sector: (1) desired stocks of financial assets, (2) de­
sired stocks of physical assets, and (3) desired stocks 
of debt. He also considers the supply of debt by finan­
cial intermediaries in the sector.^ The extent to which 
all these issues can practically be accounted for will 
depend on data availability and the scope of the specific 
application of the spatial activity analysis model. 
^Penson used two stage least squares to estimate 
only the time and demand deposit supply functions at rural 
commercial banks. 
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The emphasis of this chapter is on estimating the 
demand and supply for tionreal estate agricultural loans 
at commercial banks in Iowa counties. Banks within a 
county are assumed to provide a homogenous product (credit) 
and county boundaries are used to define market areas. 
Even though financial data are available for individual 
banks, economic and production data are not generally 
available for nonpolitical boundaries. 
While the data used in the econometric analysis 
represent a combination of time series and cross-sectional 
information, the data base was primarily cross-sectional 
in nature. A total of 297 observations were available for 
each of the variables defined in subsequent sections—three 
annual observations (1973-75) for each county in Iowa (99 
counties). 
Since the period for which data were available has 
been characterized as a period of continued increase in 
loan demand coupled with slowed deposit growth, the 
hypothesis of markets in disequilibrium is examined. 
As can be expected with cross-sectional data, the 
hypothesis of homogeneity of variances of the error term 
in the structural equations is rejected and the structural 
equations are reestimated after correcting for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Finally, some limited results estimating the 
supply of deposits at commercial banks are given. 
Demand for Agricultural Loans 
The structural equations for the supply and demand 
for nonreal estate agricultural credit at commercial 
banks are based on previous studies (59, 76, 115, 133) of 
the demand and supply for loans in the agricultural sector 
and on the general theory of the demand and supply of 
commercial bank loans given by Melitz and Pardue (124) . 
Melitz and Pardue define the dollar value of credit de­
manded by households, firms and corporations as a function 
of the interest rate on credit, permanent income of bor­
rowers, transitory income of borrowers, measurable indices 
of the taste for and productivity of credit, and factors 
which will affect the desired ratio of commercial bank 
credit. The supply of commercial bank loans is defined 
as a function of the yield on commercial bank loans, the 
yield on alternative commercial bank earnings assets, the 
cost per dollar of bank deposit liabilities and a scale 
1 
constraint. 
^Unlike previous studies, Melitz and Pardue specify 
the demand function in real terms and the supply function 
in nominal terms. However, they provide estimates for the 
case of both equations specified in nominal terms. 
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Given the availabile data, the demand for non-
real estate agricultural loans at commercial baks in 
Iowa is hypothesized to be a function of the interest rate 
on loans (R), net taxable income (I), the expected re­
turns from crops and livestock (as an Index of the pro­
ductivity of credit), and a time trend (T). The expected 
return from crops (C) is the weighted average of expected 
returns from the different crops produced in the county 
(acres times the difference in the expected return per 
acre and cost per acre). The expected return per acre is 
based on the previous year's yield and the current year's 
prices. Cost are direct costs. No data on the expected 
return from livestock are available so the value of live­
stock as of December (S) is included in the equation—but 
in a covariance fashion to account for fluctuating prices 
of feedstock and livestock during the 1973-75 period— 
where D74, and D75 are respectively dummy variables for 
1974 and 1975. Since the data base was essentially cross-
sectional, the equation is specified in nominal terms; 
however, the time trend is included to account for any 
underlying trend components of the data. 
The supply of agricultural loans (L^) by commercial 
banks is hypothesized to be a function of the interest rate 
on loans (R), the one bank concentration ratio for farm 
loans for the county (CR), the rate of return from 
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securities (RS), the unit cost of deposits (CF), total 
deposits (D), and the loan to deposit ratio (LDR). The one 
bank concentration ratio is included as a proxy for 
monopolistic power. Total deposits and the loan to deposit 
ratio are included as scale factors. The next section 
describes the data sources and financial variables in more 
detail. 
Data description and definition 
of variables 
Financial data were aggregated by county from indi­
vidual bank Call Reports of Condition and Consolidated 
Reports of Income which are collected periodically from 
each insured commercial bank in the United States. Indi­
vidual bank data were obtained on magnetic tape from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (17, 18). 
Semi-annual Call Reports, from December 1972 through 
December 1975, were used to calculate annual quantities 
of assets and liabilities:^ 
(L) nonreal estate agricultural loans—secured 
and unsecured loans to farmers except loans 
secured by real estate. 
(D) deposits--total time, savings and demand 
deposits (15 day average).^ 
Average annual quantities were calculated as fol­
lows: (data from the previous year December Call Report + 2 x 
data from the current year June Call Report + data frcm the current 
year December Call Report)/4. 
2 
For the 15 calendar days ending with the call date. 
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(CR) one bank concentration ratio for farm loans— 
the share of county loans to farmers held by 
the largest county lender to farmers. 
(LDR) loan to deposit ratio—total loans (15 day 
average) divided by total deposits ^5 day 
average). 
Data from the annual Consolidated Reports of Income, 
from December 1973 through December 1975, were combined 
with the variables calculated from the Call Reports in 
order to approximate the following variables: 
(R) interest rate on nonreal estate agricultural 
loans—interest and fees paid on loans 
divided by total loans. 
(RS) rate of return from securities—interest and 
dividends on investments divided by annual 
average quantity of investments (includes 
U.S. Treasury securities, obligations of 
other U.S. Government agencies and corpora­
tions, obligations of State and political 
subdivisions, and other securities). 
(CF) unit cost of deposits—interest paid on 
deposits minus service charges on deposits 
divided by total deposits (15 day average). 
County net taxable income and crop and livestock 
data were taken or calculated from published data compiled 
by the Iowa Department of Agriculture (85) , the Iowa 
Department of Revenue (86, 87, 88), and the Iowa Develop­
ment Commission (89). 
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Estimates of the structural equations 
Two stage least squares was used to estimate the 
coefficients of the following structural equations:^ 
^ A 
L°- = 26 ,211 - 502,769 (R)* + .36(8)** 
+ .36 (S) (D74)** + .1(3) (D75) (6.1) 
+ .00011(C)** + .000017(1)** + 2,477(T)** 
and 
L® = -76,043 + 1,075,201(R)** + .005(D) 
- 28,624 (CR)** - 16,826 (RS) 
- 320,716(CF) + 54,302(LDR)* . (6.2) 
where (**) indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the a=.01 confidence level, and (*) 
indicates the a=.05 level of significance. 
In terms of providing data input to spatial price 
and allocation models of localized financial intermedia­
tion, the principal concern is with the relationship 
between loan demand and the rate of interest. However, 
correct specification of the entire system can impact 
the validity of that estimate. 
The necessary condition for identifiability of the 
equations is met—that is the number of predetermined vari­
ables excluded from the equation must be at least as great 
as the number of endogenous variables included less one 
(93). The estimate of (R) is obtained from the first stage 
regression of R on the exogenous variables at the system. 
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The interest rate coefficient has the expected sign 
in both the demand and supply equation and both are sig­
nificant at the a=.05 level. Interest elasticities of 
demand and supply, calculated at the means, indicate both 
functions are fairly elastic; 
and §^^-.4.9 
L L 
It is difficult to judge the magnitude of these estimates, 
due to limited previous research and the failure of many 
studies to report results in terms of elasticities. 
Melitz and Pardue report generally weak results in terms 
of interest elasticity of demand for commercial bank loans 
(maximum elasticity of -.12). While they do not report a 
supply elasticity, the data provided allows an approximate 
estimate of +.96. Fisher (59), using ordinary least 
squares to estimate the demand for agricultural production 
loans at commercial banks in rural Oklahoma counties, does 
not report as interest elasticity of demand, but he pro­
vides data sufficient to make an estimate of -.95. Lins 
(115), estimating the demand and supply of agricultural 
real estate loans for various lenders, reports interest 
elasticities of demand from a low for commercial banks 
(incorrect sign and not statistically significant) to a 
high for life insurance companies of -8.37 and interest 
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elasticities of supply from a low for commercial banks of 
.16 (not statistically significant) to a high for life 
insurance companies of +6.76. 
In general, the demand function appears to be cor­
rectly specified since the remaining variables are sig­
nificant at the a=.05 level, the signs are as expected, 
and the results are stable for alternative estimation , 
1 procedures and variable definitions. The demand for loans 
is expected to be positively related to permanent income 
of borrowers and negatively related to transitory income 
(124). Since net taxable income consists of components of 
both permanent and transitory income, the expected sign 
cannot be determined. The nature of the data, however, 
would suggest that the expected sign should be positive. 
As Kuh (10 9) and Kuh and Meyer (110) point out, cross 
sectional estimates are essentially long-run in nature 
while time series estimates generally represent short-run 
behavior. The permanent income component is expected to 
dominate in long-run estimates. Although the coefficient 
is positive, the function is relatively income inelastic: 
^In addition to estimates based on alternative 
measures of income, lagged net taxable income and county 
personal income, estimates of the system were made using 
three stage least squares and limited information maximum 
likelihood with similar results. 
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Income elasticity estimates using lagged net taxable income 
and county personal income gave similar results. The sign 
of the coefficients of the crop, livestock and time trend 
variables are as expected. 
The results indicate that the supply equation is 
not as well specified as the demand function. The coef­
ficient of total deposits is positive as expected but not 
statistically significant. The coefficient of the concen­
tration ratio variable is statistically significant and 
indicates that the supply of loans is negatively related 
to an increasing share of loans held by a single bank in 
the county. This can be interpreted to mean that as a 
single bank gains monopolistic power, it restricts the 
supply of loans as would be expected. The coefficient of 
the rate of return on securities (opportunity cost of 
lending) is negative as expected but not statistically 
significantly. Melitz and Pardue suggest that an in­
crease in the unit cost of deposit liabilities indicates 
an increase in time and savings deposits relative to demand 
deposits and allows commercial banks to increase their 
relative share of risky assets (loans). Based on this 
reasoning, the expected sign of the coefficient for the 
unit cost of funds is positive. The coefficient, instead. 
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is negative but not statistically significant. The problem 
probably stems from the fact that the unit cost of deposits 
and the loan to deposit ratios are attempting to measure 
the same thing. In addition, since the loan to deposit 
ratio includes nonreal estate agricultural loans, the de­
pendent variable is, in part, being incorrectly regressed 
on itself. Future research efforts should be directed at 
replacing total deposits and the loan to deposit ratio 
with an alternative scale factor. Melitz and Pardue sug­
gest adjusted assets defined as total assets in excess of 
legally required reserves minus commercial bank loans. 
Subsequent sections consider the goodness of fit 
of the estimates of the system of demand and supply of 
nonreal estate agricultural loans, and the special prob­
lems associated with markets in disequilibrium and with 
heteroskedasticity of the variance of the error term in 
the structural equations. 
Goodness of fit 
In addition to the magnitude and statistical sig­
nificance of the regression coefficients which measure 
the systematic relationship between variables in structural 
equations, the extent to which these relationships explain 
the fluctuations of the dependent variables is also of 
2 interest (79) . Basmann (10) has shown that R , the 
154 
squared multiple correlation coefficient, may fall outside 
the 0 to 1 range where calculated for simultaneous equa­
tion models and thus is not an appropriate indicator of the 
usefulness of an estimated structural equation (38). On the 
basis of canonical correlation theory. Hooper (79) developed 
a generalized correlation coefficient for simultaneous 
equation systems. The following notation will be used to 
describe the measures developed by Hooper. 
Consider the following system of G structural 
equations; where Y is the N by G matrix of G jointly depend­
ent variables; X is the N by K matrix of K predetermined 
variables; U is the N by G matrix of structural disturb­
ances; B' and P' are respectively G by G and K by G 
coefficient matrices; and N is the number of observations: 
YB' + x r '  = U 
The reduced form equation can be written as follows; where 
the matrix of reduced form coefficients is P' = -r'(B') ^ 
and the matrix of reduced form disturbances is V = U(B') : 
Y =  xn '  + V 
Finally, Y = XII ' + V; where IT and V are estimated values. 
The measures developed by Hooper have been calcu­
lated for the two equation system of demand and supply for 
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agricultural loans presented in the previous section. The 
matrix generalization of the ratio of the estimated vari­
ance of the disturbances to the estimated variance of the 
2 dependent variable in a single equation, 1-R , is given 
as D = (Y'y) ^V'V. The matrix generalization of is 
given as follows, when I is an identity matrix of appro­
priate rank: 
I-D = [„ 654348 75049.8 -1.1705E-08 .999114 ] 
The characteristic roots of I-D are the square of the 
canonical correlations between the dependent and independ­
ent variables and represent the vector generalization 
of R^: 
.997 
657 
Finally, Hooper describes the scalar generalization of 
2 __ 2 
R , the square of the trace correlation coefficient—r . 
The trace correlation coefficient possesses properties 
similar to the multiple correlation coefficient, i.e., 
r^ + (1-r^) = 1; 0 < r^ < 1; and r^ is invariant to units 
in which the variables are measured: 
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= 1 TRACE (I-D) = .8267 (jr 
and 
One interpretation of the results is that 83 percent of 
the generalized variance of the jointly dependent vari­
ables, the volume of agricultural loans and the interest 
rate on loans, has been accounted for by reduced form 
regression relationship and that 17 percent remains un­
explained (79). Hooper also developed estimates of the 
variance of the trace correlation under both the assump­
tion that the predetermined variables are fixed variates 
and the assumption that the predetermined variables are 
normal random variables. The following equations and 
estimates are for the two equation system: 
Markets in disequilibrium 
Melichar (122) has characterized the period 1973-
1975 as one of increased price instability and thus greater 
financial risk in agricultural lending and as one during 
which considerable anxiety was expressed over the ability 
var r^ (random) I r? (1-rh^ = .00026 
NG i=l 
var r^ (fixed) \ rj (l-r\)2 (2-rJ) =.000174 
NG i=l 1 ^ ^ 
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of banks to finance agriculture. Melichar supported his 
conclusions with data from the Seventh (Chicago) and Ninth 
(Minneapolis) Federal Reserve Districts. Data showed 
continued increase in loan demand during the period while 
deposit growth slowed, decreased during 1974, and reversed 
the decline during 1975. The net effect was that institu­
tions found themselves in a significantly changed liquidity 
position—higher loan to deposit ratio—at the end of 
1975 than they were in during 1973. Additional data taken 
from bankers' responses to the Ninth District quarterly 
survey of agricultural credit conditions strengthen the 
hypothesis that agricultural loan markets were in dis­
equilibrium during the period 1973-1975. Responses to 
questions concerning various aspects of nonreal estate 
lending for the 1973-1975 period are shown in table 6.1. 
A number of econometric studies have attempted 
to estimate supply and demand functions for markets in 
disequilibrium (56, 66). The quantitative method des­
cribed by Fair and Jaffee (56) can be used to test the 
hypothesis of market disequilibrium for agricultural loans 
at commercial banks in Iowa for the period 1973-1975. The 
quantitative method can be described using the following 
normal demand/supply specifications: 
D = a^ + a^P + u^ (6.3) 
Table 6.1. Farm loan availability—Ninth District 
PERCENT OF BANKS THAT— 
refused/reduced referred more expected prob­ regarded loan actively 
farm loan re- farm loan re- lems in meeting to deposit sought new 
quest due to quests than farm loan re­ ratio as farm loan 
funds shortage normal to non- quests (current higher than accounts 
previous quarter bank institu- period) desirable 
Date tions 
1973-Ql 2 2 2 6 75 
-Q2 5 2 2 7 78 
-Q3 5 3 4 15 71 
-Q4 9 5 8 15 62 
1974-Ql 6 3 5 15 69 
-Q2 4 2 4 11 76 
-Q3 18 6 20 27 46 
-Q4 35 19 30 39 27 
1975-01 27 24 14 34 30 
-02 13 27 14 19 43 
-03 11 11 4 21 51 
-04 8 9 4 18 61 
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S = + b^P + u® (6.4) 
where quantity demanded, D, is a linear function of price, 
P, and a set of predetermined demand variables, X^. Quan­
tity supplied, S, is a linear function of price and a set 
of predetermined supply variables, X®. The disturbance 
d s 
terms are u and u . Price is not assumed to adjust each 
period so as to equate supply and demand. Instead, a change 
in price from period t-1 to t is assumed to be a positive 
function of excess demand at time t: 
AP = k(D-S) o < k ~ (6.5) 
Based on the assumption of markets in disequilibrium, the 
demand and supply specifications can be written as follows; 
Q = D-^/AP/ = a^X^ + a^P - ^ /AP/ + u^ (6.6) 
where /AP/ = AP if AP 2 0 
L 0 otherwise 
Q = S-^\AP\ = b^X® + (6.7) 
where \AE\ = -AP if AP < 0 
0 otherwise 
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When AP <_ 0, the observed quantity, Q, is demand; the 
demand specification is given by (6.3) and the supply 
specification is determined as S-^\Ap\. When AP ^  0, 
the observed quantity is supply; the supply specification 
is given by (6.4) and the demand specification is deter­
mined as D-^/AP/. 
The quantity method can be incorporated into the 
analysis of agricultural loans by (1) dropping the data 
points for 1973—in order to calculate changes in interest 
rate, and (2) including /AR/ in the demand equation and 
\Al\ in the supply equation. 
Three stage least squares was used to estimate the 
system of equations. As described by Fair and Jaffee, 
interest rate lagged one period was added to the set of 
regressors in the first stage; first stage regression over 
only that portion of the sample for which AR ^  0 is used 
to estimate R and /AR/ in the demand equation; likewise, 
first stage regression over only that portion of the 
sample for which AR £ 0 is used to estimate R and \ AR\ in 
the supply equation. The second stage regression was then 
completed using the entire sample. Finally the constraint 
that the coefficients of /AR/ and \AR\ be equal was 
accounted for in the third stage regression (8). 
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1 
The coefficient had the expected negative sign 
but was not significant at the a = .1 level. Thus the 
hypothesis that the market for agricultural loans was in 
disequilibrium was not supported. Even though one would 
expect to reject the hypothesis of markets in disequilib­
rium based on the survey information collected by the 
Federal Reserve, these negative results should not be 
unexpected given the cross-sectional nature of the data. 
Kuh (109) points out that cross-sectional estimates 
generally fail to capture inter-firm dynamic factors since 
disequilibrium among firms tends to be synchronized in 
response to common market forces and many disequilibrium 
effects wash out. 
Heteroskedasticity 
Until now, the classical least squares assumptions 
concerning the disturbance term in each structural equa­
tion have not been questioned: (1) that the expected 
value of the disturbances is zero, (2) that the distur­
bances are homoskedastic—have constant variances, and 
(3) that the disturbances are not autocorrelated. The 
assumption of constant variance is probably not realistic 
in the estimation of the demand and supply for agricul­
tural loans when the data is predominantly cross-sectional 
in nature. To test the assumption of homogeneity of 
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variances of the error term, Johnston (93) suggests applying 
the standard test for homogeneous variances to the dependent 
variable when plentiful cross-sectional data are available; 
m n./2 
If A = n (s./n.) / (%s./n) , then u = -21nA is 
i=l 1 1 1 
2 distributed approximately as under the hypothesis of 
homogeneous variances. Where the dependent variable y is 
divided into m groups according to size; n^ is the number 
of observations in group i and n is the total number of 
"i _ 2 
observations; s. ( y . .  - Y•) . Johnston points 
1 i=i ] 
out that if the regression equation is well specified, 
the variation of y values about the sample means will 
be close to the variation about the function. Table 6.2 
shows the results of applying the test to agricultural 
loan volume for the data used to estimate the supply and 
demand for agricultural loans. 
Table 6.2. Tests for homogeneity of variances 
Hypothesis of 
2 Homogeneous 
m u T (a=.01) Variances 
— — 1 
3 3486 9.21 reject 
11 3546 23.21 reject 
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While methods for correcting for autocorrelated 
disturbances in simultaneous equation systems are discussed 
in the literature (96), heteroskedasticity is discussed 
only in the context of three stage least squares where the 
disturbances are assumed to have a constant variance within 
an equation but are considered to vary from one equation to 
another. Christ (38) briefly describes the application of 
Aitkin's generalized least squares method for dealing with 
autocorrelation in simultaneous equation systems when the 
variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances of the 
structural equation to be estimated is assumed to be pro­
portional to some known matrix. While Christ does not 
point it out, the approach is generally applicable to 
treating heteroskedasticity in simultaneous equation models 
as well as serial correlation. 
Consider the following single structural equation 
from a simultaneous system: 
y = y^B + + u 
where y is the endogenous variable to be estimated; y^ 
is the set of included endogenous variables; and x^ is 
the set of included predetermined variables. The vector 
of disturbances u is assumed to have the following 
characteristics; 
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E(u) = 0 
E(uu') = 
2 
where a is unknown and ^ is a known symmetric positive 
definite matrix. The structural equation to be estimated 
can be transformed by premultiplying the equation by the 
matrix p ^ where = PP' and P ^OP ^ = I : 
— 1 "'1 ~1 
p y = p Yi^ + p + p U 
The vector of disturbances in the transformed equation 
now has the desirable least squares properties: 
E (P~^u) = 0 
- 1  - 1  '  2  
E (P uu'P ) = a I 
The equation is still subject to simultaneous equation 
bias and can now be estimated using two stage least squares 
where the included transformed endogenous variables are 
replaced by their estimated value from a first stage re­
gression on the excluded predetermined variables and the 
transformed included predetermined variables. 
The matrix 0 is typically not known. When the 
assumption of homoskedasticity has been rejected, Johnston 
suggests trying a number of simple regressions relating 
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the absolute value of residuals to a variable with which 
the variance might be associated in order to estimate 
A number of simple regressions relating the re­
siduals from equation (6.1) and total crop acres were 
tried. The following equation was estimated and used to 
estimate for the demand for agricultural loan equation: 
I residual) = 4X10~® (ACRES) ^ 
(4X10~® ACRES^)^ 
*(4X10)"® ACRES^)297 
Using the procedure described above, substituting for 
the demand for agricultural loan equation was reestimated: 
= 26,890 - 494,268 (R) + .23 (S) + .28 (S)(D74) 
+ .079 (S)(D75) + .00017(C) + .00001(1) + 2512(T) 
Coefficients of all variables were significant at the 
a = .01 level with the exception of (S)(D75) and were 
essentially unchanged from equation (6.1). The conclusion 
is that while heteroskedasticity was present, it did not 
significantly affect the estimates of the structural 
equation. 
The next section provides some limited results of 
deposit supply estimates. 
2'^  2 
on = a 
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Deposit Supply Estimates 
An attempt was made to estimate the supply of 
time and demand deposits at commercial banks using the 
theoretical model described by Penson (133). Although 
the results were generally unsatisfactory, they are 
briefly described here for completeness. 
Penson hypothesizes that the desired stock of time 
and demand deposits is in part a function of total physi­
cal assets. Only limited information concerning physical 
assets held is available in the data base. So physical 
assets are approximated by the expected value of crops 
produced during the year and the value of livestock— 
measured as of December. 
The supply of demand deposits was assumed to be a 
linear function of the rate on demand deposits, rate on 
time deposits, expected value of crops, value of live­
stock as of December, and income. 
The supply of time and savings deposits was assumed 
to be a linear function of the same set of variables as 
demand deposits. 
Since physical assets were hypothesized to be a 
function of financial assets (time and demand deposits), 
the equations are estimated using two stage least squares. 
The expected value of crops was regressed in the first 
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stage against the exogenous variables included in the 
deposit supply equations, the exogenous variables from 
the structural equations for the supply and demand for 
nonreal estate agricultural loans and the expected net 
rate of return per acre for crops and the expected return 
from real estate physical assets (approximated as the 
rate of growth of land prices). Only the coefficient of 
the income variable was statistically significant in 
the supply of demand deposit equation (the income elas­
ticity of supply was +.93). The coefficient of the rate 
on time deposits was significant in the supply of time 
deposit equation (the interest rate elasticity of supply 
was +2.4). 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The enactment of Depository Institutions Deregula­
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980 implements a number 
of the policy and regulatory changes to the U.S. financial 
system which have been proposed by a series of private and 
government directed study groups during the past 20 years; 
Congressional and industry initiatives are likely to be 
directed at additional changes during the 1980s. These 
changes can be categorized broadly into three areas: 
(1) transformation of the productive capabilities of indi­
vidual intermediaries through changes in their structural 
form and in the activities in which they may engage; 
(2) increased reliance on the market place through removal 
of price control regulations; and (3) increasing effi­
ciencies in the many channels and linkages between markets 
and intermediaries through which credit flows from sup­
pliers to ultimate users of surplus funds in the economy. 
There has been no systematic examination of the effects 
of these many proposed changes or of their impacts on 
localized financial markets. 
Mathematical programming models have been widely 
used to reflect the operational activity of individual 
financial intermediaries—especially commercial banks. 
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While some modeling of the financial intermediation system 
has proceeded at a national aggregate level in Norway, local 
financial markets have not been modeled nor have practical 
methodologies for doing so been presented. 
Using the structure of self-dual quadratic program­
ming models, financial intermediaries are characterized as 
producing units effecting the flow of funds through the 
financial system by acquisition, creation, and allocation 
of asset and liability instruments. A perfect competition 
spatial price and allocation activity analysis model for 
localized financial markets is developed and used to re­
flect most of the flow of funds linkages in local markets. 
The activity analysis structure of the model provides for 
flexibility and detail in modeling the nature of opera­
tional activities of intermediaries, and the spatial 
aspects of the model combined with endogenously determined 
pricing and flow quantities can be used to reflect market 
interaction of competing firms. 
Financial markets are often described by oligopo­
listic behavior; market segmentation and product differ­
entiation; government regulation and intervention; and 
imperfect competition not only in marketing final products, 
credit, but also in competition for funds. The perfect 
competition model is modified to include policy and 
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regulatory constraints and generalized to allow alterna­
tives to perfect competition in both asset and liability 
markets. The structure allows for perfect competition in 
some asset and liability markets and collusion in others. 
By parameterization of specified coefficients, the model 
can be used to "imitate" market competition between the 
extremes of perfect competition and collusion. 
A series of prototypes for commercial banking 
markets is developed to illustrate typical constraints 
found in models of individual financial intermediaries and 
to extend the competitive concepts of the model. The pro­
totypes include examples of nonfunds resource constraints, 
e.g. specialized labor; policy and regulatory constraints, 
e.g. collateral or pledging constraints, legal reserve 
requirements, portfolio composition constraints; and 
management constraints in terms of maturity and liquidity 
restrictions. Competitive concepts are extended to include 
differentiated products; advertising; and modeling specific 
competitive environments such as monopolistic corpetition and 
the leading firm and market-share solution to the oligopoly 
problem. 
The experiences gained in designing and implementing 
models of individual financial intermediaries will provide 
substantial data support to spatial price and allocation 
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activity analysis models of localized financial inter­
mediation. However, empirical estimates of market rela­
tionships representing the supply and demand for funds by 
nonfinancial units in the economy are not readily available 
for local markets. An econometric analysis provides some 
initial estimates of deposit supply and loan demand at 
commercial banks in Iowa. Results of deposit supply 
estimates were generally poor and the focus was on esti­
mating relationships for nonreal estate agricultural loans. 
Two stage least squares was used to estimate the 
structural equations for the demand and supply of nonreal 
estate agricultural loans. Estimates were based on county 
aggregate economic and production data for the period 
1973-1975. Detailed financial data on individual commer­
cial banks were obtained from the Federal Reserve and 
aggregated to the county level. The coefficient estimates 
were generally as expected and the analysis should serve as 
a useful benchmark against which to compare future econo­
metric results. Interest elasticities of demand and supply 
were respectively -2.3 and 4.9 indicating fairly elastic 
functions. Even though the period 1973-1975 has been 
characterized as one in which considerable anxiety was 
expressed over the ability of banks to finance agriculture, 
an attempt to estimate markets in disequilibrium failed to 
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reject the hypothesis of equilibrium. Because of the 
cross-sectional nature of the data, the hypothesis of 
homogeneity of variances of the error term in the struc­
tural equations was tested and rejected. The structural 
demand equation was reestimated after correcting for hetero-
skedasticity. However, the coefficient estimates in the 
structural equation remained essentially unchanged. 
Not only do the models developed provide an 
improved capability to reflect the topology of localized 
financial markets, a number of specific model elements 
should prove useful in modeling nonfinancial sectors of 
the economy. The models provide the most detailed treat­
ment of resource markets in self-dual programming models 
to date. While the concept of parameterizing between the 
extremes of perfect competition and collusion in final 
product markets in quadratic programming models has been 
shown, it has not previously been incorporated in self-
dual quadratic models nor extended to resource markets. 
The specific prototypes of product differentiation; 
advertising; and noncompetitive environments such as mono­
polistic competition can be applied to nonfinancial 
problems. 
Finally, while this research represents a rigorous 
formulation of the model of localized financial 
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intermediation, its value in terms of financial management 
can only be validated by successful future empirical 
applications. 
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APPENDIX A. CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR INTERMEDIARIES 
IN AGRICULTURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Table Al. Characteristics of intermediaries 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: Most diversified of deposit and lending 
institutions 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Demand deposits 
Time and savings deposits 
Capital accounts 
Banker acceptances 
Borrowing 
Interbank deposits 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Conventional, FHA, VA, commercial, farm and residential 
mortgage 
Commercial loans 
Consumer loans 
Farm loans - operating, livestock purchase, equipment 
purchase 
Corporate and government securities 
Reserves 
Régulâtion/Supervision 
Comptroller of the currency - national chartered 
State Superintendent of Banking or state agencies -
state chartered 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations Non-Federal 
Reserve member, state chartered insured banks 
Federal Reserve - state chartered member banks 
FDIC, FRS members subject to regulation regardless 
of national-state charter 
Other Important Characteristics 
Unit banking states are predominantly agricultural states 
From 1971-1975 banks controlled by holding companies in­
creased in number by 52%; deposit volume by 83% 
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Table Al. (continued) 
CREDIT UNIONS: Non-profit organizations of individuals with 
common bond of occupation, association, or residence 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Member shares-including interest and noninterest 
bearing 3rd party accounts similar to negotiable 
orders of withdrawal 
Borrowing from other credit unions and lenders 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Loans to members primarily for durable goods, personal 
household and family expenses, and repairs and 
modernization of residential property 
Loans to other credit unions 
Government securities 
Régulâtion/Supervision 
National Credit Union Administration - if incorporated 
under U.S. Federal law 
State Superintendents of Banking - if incorporated under 
one of the State's laws 
Other Important Characteristics 
Fastest growing financial intermediary in consumer 
installment lending 
Favorable tax treatment due to nonprofit status 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS: Stock or mutual organizations 
primarily concerned with deposit needs of members and use of 
funds for residential mortgages 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Time and savings deposits - including interest and non-
interest bearing NOW accounts 
Advances from Federal Home Loan Bank 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Residential mortgage loans - conventional, VA, FHA 
Securities-except private sector debt or equity issues 
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Table Al. (continued) 
Regulation/Supervision 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board - if insured by Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or if not 
supervised by states 
State Superintendents of Banking - if state chartered 
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS: Similar to savings loan stock 
institutions 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Time and savings deposits 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Mortgage loans - especially VA, FHA 
Government securities 
Corporate debt 
Regulation/Supervision 
State Superintendents of Banking 
Other Important Characteristics 
Most located on east coast of U.S. - represent important 
deposit institutions in these states 
COOPERATIVE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM: Federal Land Banks, Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks, Production Credit Associations 
Regulation/Supervision 
Farm Credit Administration 
Other Important Characteristics 
Exempt from state usury laws 
Tax advantages - important consideration in competi­
tion with commercial banks 
195 
Table Al. (continued) 
Federal land banks; Cooperative system owned by people who 
use services to provide dependable low cost long-term credit 
to rural customers 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Sale of consolidated Federal Land Bank bonds 
Income from lending operations and investments—each 
borrower required to purchase stock equal to not 
less than 5% or greater than 10% of loan 
Capitalized by stock held by Federal Land Bank 
Associations 
Principal Uses of Funds 
First mortgage loan on real estate 
Other Important Characteristics 
Link with customers primarily through Federal Land Bank 
Associations 
Interest rate held to lowest possible level consistent 
with sound business practices 
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks; Owned by PCAs who use 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Sale of bonds in national financial market 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Provide funds to owner Production Credit Association 
Production Credit Associations: Cooperative ownership through 
purchase of stock by borrowers provide dependable source of 
short-term credit to farmers and ranchers 
Principal Sources of Funds 
From Federal Intermediate Credit Banks—pledge notes 
of member borrowers 
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Table Al. (continued) 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Loans for—operating expenses, livestock purchases, 
livestock production, equipment purchase, living 
expenses, real estate 
Operating loans usually for one year; loans for 
capital purchase up to 7 years 
Other Important Characteristics 
Other services include AGRIFAX—an electronic record 
keeping system 
Credit life insurance 
Crop hail insurance 
Farmers Home Administration; Agency of the Department of 
Agriculture 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Direct short- or long-term loans to farmers unable 
to get credit through conventional lenders. 
Regulation/Supervision 
Department of Agriculture 
Other Important Characteristics 
Initial obligations to farmers generates $1.23 in loans 
from other lenders for every $1.00 of FHA loans 
(1976) 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES: Provide death benefits to 
customers 
Principal Sources of Funds 
Policy premiums 
Principal Uses of Funds 
Corporate bonds 
Commercial, residential, farm mortgages 
Securities 
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Table Al. (continued) 
Regulation/Supervision 
Subject to state and federal laws 
Other important Characteristics 
Generally suffers from disadvantageous tax status in 
competition with other lenders 
198 
APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF MAJOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS REFORM PACKAGES 1971-1976 
Table Bl. Comparison of reform packages (29, 30, 165, 
166, 167, 68) 
Recommendations; Sources 
of Funds 
Hunt 
Commission 
1971 
President's 
Recommen­
dations 
1973 
Financial 
Institu- FINE 
tions Act Study 
1975 1976 
Phase out interest rate 
ceilings on savings and 
time deposits 
Allow savings and loans 
(SL) and mutual savings 
banks (MSB) to offer 
demand deposits and 
third-party payment 
services 
Allow commercial banks 
(CB), SL, MSB to offer 
full service corporate 
and individuals, nego­
tiable order of with­
drawal (NOW) accounts 
Allow national CB to offer 
corporate savings accounts 
Remove limits on CB crea­
tion of acceptances 
Phase out prohibition of 
interest rate payment on 
demand deposits 
Allow credit unions (CU) 
to offer variable share 
certificates similar time 
and savings accounts 
Allow community CU in low-
income areas to issue 
demand deposits and other 
third party arrangements 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Recommendations; Uses of Funds 
Abolish CB restrictions on real 
estate loans X 
Expand CB real estate loan 
powers 
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Table Bl. (continued) 
1971 1973 1975 1976 
Recommendations! Uses of Funds (cont.) 
Allow CB "leeway" in investment in any asset 
(some size limits and limits on equity 
investments) X 
Allow CB, SL, MSB equity investment in com­
munity rehabilitation and development 
projects intended to improve low and 
middle income groups employment and 
housing X 
Allow CB, SL, MSB community rehabilitation 
loans (within limits) X X 
Allow SL, MSB limited consumer loan powers' 
consumer loans limited to 10% of assets; X X 
powers to include credit card payments and 
revolving lines offered and to extend 
powers to CU X 
Allow SL, MSB real estate loan powers under 
same conditions as CB XXX 
Allow SL, MSB commercial loan powers to extent 
loans are related to housing X 
Allow expanded SL, MSB: investment in equities 
(size, % of issue and quality limits; no 
investment in CB, stock SL or their holding 
companies); X 
investment in all U.S. government, state and 
municipal debt instruments of all maturities X 
limited acquisition of high-grade private 
debt securities; X 
acquisition of commercial paper, banker's 
acceptances and high grade corporate debt 
(10% of assets); X 
invest in commercial paper, corporate debt 
and bankers' acceptances—extend powers to 
CU X 
Allow SL, MSB to make loans anywhere in U.S. 
or territories X 
Allow SL: to make interim construction loans 
not tied to permanent financing; X X 
ownership in real estate and non-interest 
yielding loan agreements; X 
unrestricted loan powers for mobile homes; X 
200 
Table Bl. (continued) . 
1971 1973 1975 1976 
Recommendations; Uses of Funds (cont.) 
Minor liberalization of CU lending powers X 
All CU to offer credit lines in accordance with 
credit worthiness of member X 
Allow CU to offer 30 year mortgages to members X 
Allow CU to offer longer maturity consumer loans X 
Recommendations : Taxation 
Uniform tax system for all deposit institutions X X 
No change in tax exempt status for CU XX 
CU tax responsibility in accord with expanded 
powers X 
CB, SL, MSB tax credit for investment in 
residential mortgages X 
Individual and corporation tax credit on 
residential mortgage investment X 
Mortgage tax credit for properties destined for 
low or middle income owners or renters X 
For SL, MSB tax credit could replace special 
treatment of bad debt reserves X 
Recommendations ; Chartering, Conversion, 
Branching 
Allow dual charter (federal, state) for SL, MSB X X 
Allow federal charter for mutual commercial 
banks X 
Allow Federal Home Loan Bank Board charter of 
federal stock SL or MSB X 
Allow or encourage state-wide branching for 
CB, SL, MSB X 
Allow interstate branching for federally 
insured depository institutions (unless in 
conflict with state law) X 
If state law conflict exists, allow federally 
insured out-of-state institutions and fed­
erally charter in-state institutions to branch 
in SMSA with population in excess of two million 
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Table Bl. (continued) 
1971 1973 1975 1976 
Recommendations: Chartering, Conversion, 
Branching (cont.) 
Allow foreign bank branching in accord with 
domestic bank restrictions X 
Allow freedom of conversion X X 
SL, MSB state to federal, federal to state, 
mutual to stock, stock to mutual 
Federal chartered SL to national bank 
(FDIC supervision) 
Mutual SL to federal charter, national 
bank or SL 
Recommendations; Supervision and Regulation 
Establish Administrator of State Banks to 
supervise state-chartered insured CB, MSB 
and SL (with third-party payments in excess 
of 10% of liabilities) X 
Rename comptroller of the Currency to Office 
of the National Bank Administrator and 
give authority over national CB, federally 
chartered MSB, mutual CB, federally 
chartered SL (with third-party payments 
orders in excess of 10% of liabilities) X 
Remove Federal Reserve authority over state 
member X 
Remove Federal Deposit Insurance corporation 
authority over state chartered, insured CB X 
Establish Federal Deposit Guarantee Adminis­
tration to coordinate insurance function of 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance, Corpor-
tion and National Credit Union Administration X 
All federally insured depository institutions 
and their holding companies would be super­
vised and regulated by new Federal Depository 
Institutions Commission X 
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Table B1. (continued) 
1971 1973 1975 1976 
Recommendations: Housing and Mortgage Markets 
Eliminate interest rate ceilings on VA-guaranteed 
and FHA-insured mortgages X X 
and prohibit such market distortions as 
charging points X 
Adoption of variable rate mortgages X 
Encourage states to eliminate ceilings on 
residential mortgages X 
Encourage states to eliminate "doing business" 
taxes on out of state institutions X 
Allow Federal Home Loan Bank Board to lend 
directly to depository institution providing 
mortgage loans for low and moderate income 
housing X 
Allow Federal Reserve Board to provide reserve 
credits to all depository institutions on new 
and outstanding low and moderate income 
housing and construction loans X 
Recommendations ; Reserve Requirements 
Require mandatory Federal Reserve membership 
for CB and SL, MSB with third-party accounts X 
Require reserves on demand deposits and NOW 
accounts of federally chartered institutions 
which are members of Federal Reserve of 
Federal Home Loan Bank X 
Federal Reserve sets reserve requirements : 
demand deposits are NOW accounts (1-22%), 
savings accounts (1-5%), time accounts 
(1-10%) X 
Require all federally insured depository insti­
tutions to meet Reserve requirements. Reserves 
to be held at Federal Reserve X 
Phase in equal treatment for all institutions of 
a given size X X 
Eliminate reserve requirements on time, savings, 
share accounts and certificates of deposit X 
Federal Reserve sets reserve requirements 
between 7 and 22% X 
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Table Bl. (continued) 
1971 1973 1975 1976 
Recommendations; Reserve Requirements (cont.) 
Allows full and equitable access to all Federal 
Reserve facilities for all institutions re­
quired to maintain reserves X 
Allow limited Federal Reserve facilities for 
foreign banks X 
Recommendations : Other 
Allow CB, SL, MSB to engage in same financed 
fiduciary or insurance activities as approved 
for bank holding companies (SL, MSB only for 
individual and non-business customers) X 
Allow CB authority to underwrite municipal 
revenue bonds secured by revenues from essen­
tial public services X 
Allow CB, SL, MSB authority to sell and manage 
mutual funds, including commingled agency 
accounts X 
Grant Federal Reserve more flexible authority 
to define assets eligible for discounts 
Allow CB to underwrite state and municipal 
securities including revenue bonds 
Allow SL, MSB, CU power to engage in same trust 
activities as CB under supervision at new 
Federal Depository Institutions Commission 
Allow CU opportunity to obtain liquidity ad­
vances from a Central Discount Fund X 
Allow CU to sell travelers checks, registered 
checks, cashier's checks and mortgage life 
insurance X 
Allow CU to market bookkeeping and data 
processing services X 
Eliminate CB restrictions on discount eligi­
bility of certain assets X 
Expanded regulatory supervision of trust 
activities and pension funds X 
Encourage states to change laws so as to allow 
flexible loan rates in life insurance policy 
in order to reflect current market rates X 
Encourage more equitable tax treatment for in­
surance companies relative to other financial 
intermediaries X 
Continue study of Electronic funds transfer systems 
